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I. First Moves
I examine the basic logical character of ‘the last man example’, as well as
the logical character of one of its more important variants. Although it has
one striking antecedent in recent philosophy – of which more later – it’s
fair to regard it as an example first presented to a contemporary audience
by Richard Routley in his 1973 paper, ‘Is There a Need for a New, an
Environmental, Ethic?’.1 I want to determine exactly how the example goes
and what it shows. I want to determine what it does not show. One reason
∗From the Managing Editor: The use of the sexist language is not condoned by the
editors of this Journal. “The Last Man” is used because this is, at least in part, a historical
piece and the historical figure that is the subject of the paper – Richard Routley/Sylvan –
used it.
1An early version of the paper was originally “presented at the New Zealand Philosophy
Conference, Hamilton 1973” (vide Val Routley, ‘Critical Notice’ of Passmore’s Man’s
Responsibility for Nature, AJP 53, No. 2 (August, 1975), fn. 1); then a “shortened version”
delivered at the World Congress of Philosophy in Bulgaria in September, 1973, and
subsequently published in the not very accessible Proceedings of the XV World Congress of
Philosophy No. 1, Varna, Bulgaria, 1973, pp. 205-210. The latter version has subsequently
been reprinted as the lead article in Michael E. Zimmerman’s widely accessible anthology
of philosophical and environmental writings, Environmental Philosophy: From Animal
Rights to Radical Ecology, Prentice Hall (1993), pp. 12-21. It is this pagination that I
will employ in what follows. In ‘A Very Brief History of the Origins of Environmental
Ethics for the Novice’, web-published by the Center for Environmental Philosophy at the
University of North Texas (presently the home of the journal Environmental Ethics) at
http://www.cep.unt.edu/novice.html, Routley’s article is mentioned as, chronologically,
the sixth piece since the ‘60s which helped to inspire environmental ethics, behind Aldo
Leopold’s ‘The Land Ethic’ in his Sand County Almanac (1949), Lynn White’s ‘The
Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis’ (1967), Garrett Hardin’s ‘The Tragedy of the
Commons’ (1968), Pete Gunter’s ‘The Big Thicket: A Case Study in Attitudes Toward
the Environment’ (1972, published 1974), and John Cobb’s Is It Too Late? A Theology of
Ecology (1972).
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for engaging in this exercise is the striking and engaging character of the
last man example itself. Another is that a large number of environmental
philosophers have since referred to the last man but have drawn different,
sometimes contrary, lessons from it – though we won’t have time here to
visit any but the earliest of these responses. It seems to me time to patiently
revisit the example and time to attempt a conclusive understanding of its
significance.
A second, and broader, purpose I have is to describe the meta-ethical views
it led Routley to adopt – or manufacture! – in an attempt to philosophi-
cally position his normative stance within a more fundamental, explanatory,
framework.
What I will do first is cite its original statement:
LM “The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving
the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as
far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly
if you like, as at the best abattoirs).” (p. 16)2
Richard thinks of this as a “counter example” (16) to the principle that:
FP “ ‘...one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1)
that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to
harm himself irreparably.’ ”3
2It is possible to substitute other less extensive classes for the very broad class picked
out by “every living thing, animal or plant”, and yet remain aligned with the valuational
intuitions guiding the last man example. Thus one could, as Routley himself does in the
so-called “last people example”, suppose that what gets exterminated is “every wild animal
and...the fish of the seas” whilst “all arable land [is put] under intensive cultivation, and
all remaining forests disappear in favor of quarries or plantations”. [Routley, ibid., p. 17]
3Ibid., p. 15. Here Routley has quoted Barkley and Seckler’s, Economic Growth and
Environmental Decay: The Solution Becomes the Problem (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1972, p. 58), at a point where these authors are describing a principle they take
to characterize “the liberal philosophy of the Western world”. Compare their formulation of
the principle with an even less restrictive principle which H.L.A. Hart prefers: “...any adult
human...capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e., is under no obligation to abstain from)
any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons”.
[H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ reprinted in A. Quinton, ed., Political
Philosophy, OUP (1967); and cited by Routley, ibid., p. 19.]
In the later ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’ (1980), the Routleys
correctly note (p. 117) that “It appears...that Mill would have rejected the principle on
account of clause (2)” citing the following less restrictive passage from On Liberty:
“[The permanent interests of man as a progressive being] authorise the sub-
jection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect of those
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This principle of individual liberty he calls the “freedom principle”, and the
last man is a counter example to it because: firstly, the last man in his last
willful but “eliminating” acts satisfies the twin permissibility conditions for
voluntary acts set out in the Freedom Principle – of (a) not harming others
(at least where “others” refers only to other human beings; or if it extends to
all sentient creatures, then where “harm” to the non-humans among them is
understood as requiring the suffering4 of non-humans harmed), and (b) not
harming himself; and secondly, contrary to the liberal Freedom Principle, the
last man should not, so Routley claims, ‘be able’ to do this. Such a person
would be behaving “in a morally impermissible way” (18). Here, clearly, the
last man features in a moral claim, and this appearance is crucial to any
argument (suiting Richard’s purpose) in which the last man can figure.
The cultural and philosophical significance for Routley of the last man’s
counter-exemplary status with respect to the Freedom Principle follows from
his identification of the Freedom Principle as a “core principle embedded in
Western [ethical] systems” (15), themselves a “family of ethical systems” (13)
‘clustered under’ a “Western super ethic” (15) to which the core principle
“belongs” (15). He calls the Freedom Principle, so understood, by the addi-
tional name of “basic (human) chauvinism” (15). Basic human chauvinism
is, accordingly, embedded in a family of Western ethical systems; and is
therefore a part of a prevailing Western super ethic.5 Summing, in producing
actions of each, which concern the interest of other people.” [On Liberty,
Chapter 1, para. 11.]
4This aligns with Routley’s parenthetical remark, “...but painlessly, if you like, as at
the best abattoirs”.
5It is perhaps illustrative of this point to quote at this juncture a passage from John
Passmore’s nearly contemporary book, Man’s Responsibility for Nature (1974):
“The traditional moral teaching of the West, Christian or utilitarian, has
always taught men. . . that they ought not so to act as to injure their neighbors.
And we have now discovered that the disposal of wastes into sea or air, the
destruction of ecosystems, the procreation of large families, the depletion
of resources, constitute injury to our fellow-men, present and future. To
that extent, conventional morality, without any supplementation whatsoever,
suffices to justify our ecological concern, our demand for action against
the polluter, the depleter of natural resources, the destroyer of species and
wildernesses.
One of my colleagues, an ardent preservationist, condemns me as a ‘human
chauvinist’. What he means is that in my ethical arguments, I treat human
interests as paramount. I do not apologize for that fact; an ‘ethic dealing
with man’s relation to land and the plants and animals growing on it’ would
not only be about the behaviour of human beings, as is sufficiently obvious,
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an example which he takes to be a counter example to the Freedom Principle
(i.e., basic human chauvinism), he takes himself to have produced a counter
example to a core or “fundamental” (13) principle embedded in (presumably
at least most) Western ethical systems, and therefore a counter example to
the prevailing Western super ethic.
So described, the work of the last man example is, thus far, merely negative:
there is an identifiable core principle embedded in Western ethical systems,
and the last man example shows it up as an unacceptable principle. As the
identity of ethical systems is a matter of the identity of their core principles6,
to find a reason to reject a core principle of any system is to find a reason
to reject the system itself, as well as a reason to reject any family of such
systems – i.e., any super ethic – to which the core principle “belongs”.
Still, such negative work is only the beginning. If the “Western super ethic” –
defined at least in part by the Freedom Principle’s ‘belonging’ to it – is to be
rejected because of the work of the last man, then what the last man has also
done in the same logical breath is demonstrate the “need for a new...ethic”,
one precisely not incorporating the Freedom Principle – at least not in its
present formulation.
Thirdly, it is important to note that the last man works, to the degree that
it does, because what the last man, himself, does is evidently wrong; and
this “on environmental grounds”. Richard writes:
“What [the last man] does is quite permissible according to
basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is
wrong.”7
but would have to be justified by reference to human interests. The land
which a bad farmer allows to slip into a river did not have a ‘right’ to stay
where it was.” (pp. 186-187).
The odd thing about Passmore’s utterance of the last sentence is that he had himself
earlier acknowledged that having moral obligations with respect to x does not imply x’s
having rights:
“. . . in Hart’s words, ‘moral rules impose obligations and withdraw certain
areas of conduct from the free option of the individual to do as he likes’.
(H.L.A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961, p. 7.) But that men have
lost rights over them does nothing to convert animals into bearers of rights,
any more than we give rights to a river by withdrawing somebody’s right to
pollute it.” (pp. 115-6)
6See Routley, op. cit., p. 15.
7Ibid., p. 16.
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It follows that we know of the new8 ethic: that a need for it has been
demonstrated; that it will not include the Freedom Principle, at least not as
thus far enunciated; and that it offers (or will offer) “environmental grounds”
for morally assessing action.
However, as far as the way the last man itself works, that is all we know of
the new ethic. It is true that in the same article Routley urges, additionally,
that such an ethic “does not commit one to the view that natural objects
such as trees have rights”9, but he urges this on grounds which are extraneous
to the way the last man example need work.10
8That it is new is not established if any part of ‘traditional ethics’ is not bound to
‘basic chauvinism’. There have been discussions which urge that the tradition of ideal
utilitarianism is not so bound. Chief and earliest among ideal utilitarians was G. E. Moore,
about whom more shortly.
9Ibid., p. 19. Here the quarrel is with Passmore (see fn. 5). Routley writes:
“An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects
such as trees have rights. ... That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree
or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a
correlative right not to be mutilated.” (19)
10Val Routley is perhaps marginally clearer than Richard on this matter, referring to:
“. . . the deontic distinction between recognising obligations concerning or
with respect to an item, as opposed to recognising obligations toward an item,
which are often coupled with correlative rights.” (Val Routley, op. cit., p.
174)
On this matter, she writes that “This traditional distinction is explained in H. J.
McCloskey: ‘Rights’, Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1965), pp. 115-27”. In that article, at his
own footnote 11 (p. 122), McCloskey writes:
“The notion of a duty to needs examination. We often speak of duties to
when we really mean duties concerning, involving, etc., as in talk about
duties to oneself. However, we do have duties which are properly described as
duties to – e.g. a duty of gratitude to our benefactor, a duty to our creditor,
a duty of fidelity to one’s spouse, a duty of loyalty to one’s country. However,
it is difficult to see what the principle is that leads us to speak of such duties
as "duties to". With things, and even with animals, we seem to speak of
duties as involving them, rather than as being to them. If institutions such
as the State and the Church may be objects of duties to, why not things
and animals? Yet the duty to preserve a great painting (even if the duty
of the last person in the universe) is not a duty to the painting. Similarly
with animals. If I don’t feed my cat, I can be reproached as not having done
what I ought and as having no right to treat it as I did, but we should be
disinclined to speak of my duty to my cat, or to justify such remarks by talk
about its right to a square meal a day. Rather, we should speak of duties not
to be cruel, etc.; by contrast, if parents neglected their offspring, allusions to
their duties to their children would be made quickly and naturally.”
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It’s important to realize, then, that there is nothing in this early presentation
of the last man which explicitly calls for a theoretical commitment from within
the new ethic to the intrinsic (i.e., non-instrumental, or ‘final’) value of
living things, whether that value be objectively, or subjectively, sourced – or
something else again. All the same, given the idealized nature of the example,
it’s not possible to ground the wrongness of the last man’s last, and biocidal,
acts in terms of their destruction of things having actual non-intrinsic – i.e.,
instrumental – value, for present or future humans.11
Still, Richard offers one “tentative” (18) suggestion as to how the Freedom
Principle might be re-enunciated, indeed, made more restrictive, which does
utilize the notion of instrumental value. Instead of allowing one to do what
one wishes unless (i) it harms others, or (ii) harms oneself irreparably, the
Freedom Principle might be modified so as to allow one to do what one
wishes unless (i) or (ii) – as before – or (iii) would harm others “were they
placed in the environment”12. Here the instrumental value appealed to is not
actual instrumental value but subjunctively possible instrumental value. This
suggestion is offered tentatively, and Routley thinks it’s “none too adequate”
(18). The only further remark which goes to the matter of the suggestion’s
inadequacy is this one: “It may be preferable, in view of the way the Freedom
Principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to
specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights.” (18).
Still, if it should be altogether scrapped, then the character of the ‘new
ethic’ is left completely undetermined, except that: (a) a need for it has been
demonstrated; (b) it will not contain the freedom principle, not even the more
restrictive version just contemplated; and (c) it will offer “environmental
grounds” for morally assessing action. What the character of such grounds
will be is, at this early point, left entirely undetermined.
11For the simple reason that their destruction may be thought of as following the last
man’s own death.
12The full passage is:
“But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory freedom principle
is a...difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might
be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others
who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the
environment and (3) to exclude speciecide.” [Routley, op. cit., p. 18.]
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II. G. E. Moore, intrinsic value, and the method of isolation
Before pursuing early discussions, and further elaborations, of the last man,
I wish to turn to the “one striking antecedent in recent philosophy” alluded
to earlier. It’s from G. E. Moore, specifically from section 50 of Principia
Ethica:
“50. ... ‘No one,’ says Prof. Sidgwick, ‘would consider it rational
to aim at the production of beauty in external nature, apart from
any possible contemplation of it by human beings.’13 Well, I may
say at once, that I, for one, do consider this rational; and let
us see if I cannot get any one to agree with me. Consider what
this admission really means. It entitles us to put the following
case. Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine
it as beautiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth
you most admire – mountains, rivers, the sea; trees, and sunsets,
stars and moon. Imagine these all combined in the most exquisite
proportions, so that no one thing jars against another, but each
contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then imagine
the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply
one heap of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to
us, for whatever reason, and the whole, as far as may be, without
one redeeming feature. Such a pair of worlds we are entitled to
compare: they fall within Prof. Sidgwick’s meaning, and the
comparison is highly relevant to it. The only thing we are not
entitled to imagine is that any human being ever has or ever,
by any possibility, can, live in either, can ever see and enjoy the
beauty of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even
so, supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation
by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is better
that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly?
13The extract is from Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London (1901).
The full passage is:
“I think that if we consider carefully such permanent results as are commonly
judged to be good, other than qualities of human beings, we can find nothing
that, on reflection, appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to
human existence, or at least to some consciousness or feeling. For example, we
commonly judge some inanimate objects, scenes, etc. to be good as possessing
beauty, and others bad from ugliness: still no one would consider it rational to
aim at the production of beauty in external nature, apart from any possible
contemplation of it by human beings.” (pp. 113-4)
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Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce
it rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that
it would....”14
I won’t dwell on specific points of similarity between Moore’s example and
Routley’s, although they’re striking, and considerable.15 I want instead to
say something about the use to which Moore put his example. This use is
detailed by him later in Principia Ethica. First of all, what does Moore think
he has done?
“I have myself urged in section 50 that the mere existence of
what is beautiful does appear to have some intrinsic value....”16
14G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press (1903), sect. 50, pp. 83-84.
Italics his.
15Somehow, I do find it amusing to think of such disparate characters, Routley and
Moore, as having anything of importance in common. Nevertheless, it is quite regrettable
that in spite of the manifest similarity between Moore and Routley in the case of their
examples, Richard never alluded – so far as I can determine – to Moore’s own example.
Indeed, in one place the Routleys write that:
“Moore’s chauvinistic account. . . appears open to familiar objections – e.g.
those based on. . . beautiful worlds lacking conscious beings – which help show
that beauty is what counts. . . .” [R. & V. Routley, ‘Human Chauvinism and
Environmental Ethics’ (1980), p. 167, fn. 81.]
But, as we have just seen ‘beautiful worlds lacking conscious beings’ are precisely what
figure in Moore’s example from Sect. 50. It is true that Moore goes on to say
“I regard it as indubitable that. . . [the] mere existence of what is beautiful has
value, {so small as to be negligible, in comparison with that which attaches
to the consciousness of beauty}.” [G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Sect. 113,
p. 189]
The Routleys cite the text within the curly brackets (in their fn. 81, p. 167), and dwell
upon this aspect of Moore’s views rather than their ground-breaking character.
16Moore, op. cit., sect. 113, p. 189. My emphasis. As inspection of the longer passage
from section 50 will demonstrate, Moore takes himself to be urging in that passage that it
is rational “to aim at the production of beauty in external nature, apart from any possible
contemplation of it by human beings”. His explanation for why it is rational so to do is in
terms of the apparent intrinsic value of that which is beautiful.
Moore, however, was to give up the view that “the mere existence of what is beautiful”
has intrinsic value, in favour of the view that any whole possessing intrinsic value must
contain an element of feeling, consciousness, appreciation, or pleasure. Thus in the later
(1912) Ethics, he wrote:
“...it does seem as if nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains both
some feeling and also some other form of consciousness; and, as we have said
before, it seems possible that amongst the feelings contained must always be
some amount of pleasure”. (p. 249)
Still later, in 1942, he writes in his ‘Reply to My Critics’ that
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By “intrinsic value”, Moore refers to a form of value which contrasts with
“value as a means”17. He does not use the term ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to the
source of value, e.g., to value as ‘objective’ (or cosmogenic).18 Now, Moore
thinks he has shown that the mere existence of what is beautiful appears
to have some intrinsic value and, moreover, it’s fair to conclude that he
also thinks he’s shown that the mere existence of what is beautiful appears
to have more intrinsic value than the mere existence of that which is ugly.
Thus, he asks rhetorically,
“Well, even so, supposing them quite apart from any possible
contemplation by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that
it is better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one
which is ugly?”19
What is his method of showing this? Moore proposes what he calls ‘the
method of isolation’ as the proper method for demonstrating what things
have intrinsic value.
“The method which must be employed in order to decide the
“I agree...now, as I did not when I wrote Principia, that the existence of some
experience is a proposition which does follow from the hypothesis that there
exists a state of affairs which is good: I think now that no state of affairs can
be good, unless its existence entails the proposition that somebody is having
some experience.” [The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, Tudor
Publishing Company, 2nd edition, 1952, pp. 617-618.]
17See Moore, Principia Ethica, section 15, p. 21, where he explicitly distinguishes
‘intrinsic value’ from ‘value as a means’. Again, in section 18, p. 27, where he refers to “the
confusion of intrinsic value with mere ‘goodness as a means”’. Similarly, in the concluding
portion of section 50 (pp. 84-5), he writes of that which is good ‘in itself ’, that if:
“...Prof. Sidgwick’s principle has broken down[, t]hen we shall have to include
in our ultimate end something beyond the limits of human existence. I admit,
of course, that our beautiful world would be better still, if there were human
beings in it to contemplate and enjoy its beauty. But that admission makes
nothing against my point. If it be once admitted that the beautiful world in
itself is better than the ugly, then it follows, that however many beings may
enjoy it, and however much better their enjoyment may be than it is itself,
yet its mere existence adds something to the goodness of the whole: it is not
only a means to our end, but also itself a part thereof.”
It is made plain in this passage that he regards that which is good in itself as that which
is good as an end.
18Of course, there is no doubting that Moore is an ‘objectivist’ when it comes to the
matter of the source of intrinsic goodness. See his reference to “the objective question
whether the whole in question is or is not truly good” (sect. 121, p. 201).
19Ibid., sect. 50, p. 84.
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question ‘What things have intrinsic value, and in what degrees?’
has already been explained in Chap. III (sects. 55, 57). In order
to arrive at a correct decision on the first part of this question, it
is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed
by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their
existence to be good; and, in order to decide upon the relative
degrees of value of different things, we must similarly consider
what comparative value seems to attach to the isolated existence
of each.”20
It’s clear Moore is following the second application of this ‘method of isolation’
in his example of the two worlds. It’s equally clear that in Routley’s example,
we are asked to isolate two possible worlds, not both of which can be
actualised. As with Moore, Routley requires these domains to be isolated
from all “possible contemplation...by human beings”21, i.e., no one will ever
live in either, see either, enjoy or hate either. In Routley, though not in
Moore, this is done by the simple expedient of making sure, ex hypothesi,
that – upon the performance of the last act – there are no more human
beings. Such isolation – in both Moore and Routley – keeps valuational
waters unmuddied by any instrumental value otherwise attributable to items
left behind. Moore’s explicit conclusion is that, necessarily, any items of
value will be intrinsically valuable; and that the degree of intrinsic value of
two such isolated worlds may be compared.
Such august precedent may give us some historical cause for inspecting
Routley’s last man and immediately concluding that what we have withal
is something which may show of the new ethic (which, remember, will be
offering “environmental grounds” for morally assessing action) that it must
include reference to the intrinsic value of some kinds of world22 and, indeed,
20Ibid., sect. 112, p. 187. Compare his remarks in the later Ethics (Williams and
Norgate, London, 1912), p. 58:
“In order to discover whether any one thing is intrinsically better than another,
we have always thus to consider whether it would be better that the one should
exist quite alone than that the other should exist quite alone. No one thing
or set of things, A, ever can be intrinsically better than another, B, unless it
would be better that A should exist quite alone than that B should exist quite
alone.”
21Of course, given that not both of them can be actualised, they are isolated from each
other as well.
22Indeed, by 1978, Robert Elliot in a brief discussion of the last people example, of
which more later, effectively defines the new ethic as one making use of the notion of the
intrinsic value of the continued existence of species:
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the greater intrinsic value of some kinds of world over others.
However, as we’ve seen, Richard, himself, does not draw this conclusion
anywhere in his earliest presentation (1973) of the last man, mentioning only
the possibility of including a further restrained freedom principle.
III. The possibility of acting badly, even though there is good
instrumental reason so to do: the ‘last people’ example
To return to the last man example, it may seem to some of the more
deontologically-inclined amongst us that what the last man does is wrong
but that this is because his motives for “eliminating, as far as he can, every
living thing, animal or plant” are suspect. It may seem, so far as the case
is specified anyway, that he is doing it ‘just for the hell of it’. (16) Routley,
however, is of the view that even if he had “the best of reasons”, what he
does is wrong. This view is both manifested and urged in his second example,
the one he calls “the last people example”.
LP “The last people example. The last man example can be
broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they
know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that
radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. ... Let
us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely
exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the
seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all
remaining forests disappear in favor of quarries or plantations,
and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g.,
they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed
to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do
not worry too much about their impending extinction. On an
“...th[e] example of speciescide does seem to be wrong. The question to ask
then is whether the wrongness of the act can be explained without invoking
an ecological ethic; that is without assigning some intrinsic value to the
continued existence of the species.” [Robert Elliot, ‘Why Preserve Species?’,
p. 22. Details of this article at fn. 48 below.]
Three years earlier (1975), Val Routley – in her excellent ‘Critical Notice’ of Passmore’s
Man’s Responsibility for Nature (1974) – had criticized Passmore for not seriously discussing
the intrinsic value hypothesis as part of the ‘new ethic’ (even though this hypothesis, so
contextualized, had not thus far been aired in publication by either of the Routleys). [AJP,
Vol. 53, No.2; August 1975, pp. 181-2] Clearly, however, it was ‘in the air’; it was coming.
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environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they
have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems,
and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely
wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic
chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by
the lesser traditions.” (16-17)
Routley goes on to say that
“Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because,
as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict
with stewardship or co-operation principles.23 The conflict may
be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic
principle, [to] the effect (3) that he does not willfully24 destroy
natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources
willfully, but perhaps ‘for the best of reasons’, the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.” (17)
But elaborating this example has another utility, I believe. Suppose the
23These (“the stewardship position, with man as custodian”, and “the co-operative
position with man as perfecter” (13)) are two “lesser” traditions, according to Routley.
(Passmore was, concurrently, characterizing these traditions at some length in Man’s
Responsibility to Nature (1974).) Routley is of the view that both lesser traditions
“. . . imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental
ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be preserved from
substantial human interference. . . .” (14)
What this (especially “imply”) seems to mean (minimally) is that: according to the lesser
traditions, complete interference is morally permissible – i.e., PE(complete interference);
but according to an environmental ethic, ∼PE(complete interference) – where “PE” =df.
“it is morally permissible that”. Routley continues:
“According to the co-operative position man’s proper role is to develop, cultivate
and perfect nature – all nature eventually – by bringing out its potentialities,
the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature
productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its
resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in
a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental
ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go
far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined
to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming
and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what
a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use,
implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for
human ends, ‘humanized’.” (14)
24In the sense given by the OED: “governed by will without regard to reason”.
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last man does show the kind of thing Moore might have been willing to
conclude from it (but which Routley, himself, had not yet concluded), viz.,
that it is rational (or even rationally required) to hold that living things, as
such, have some intrinsic value, and that one kind of world – in fact, the
Earth, still containing living things but nevertheless bereft of the possibility
of any further human contemplation – would be a better world than the
Earth, made dead, and similarly bereft. Comparing such worlds in respect
of their value does not permit comparisons between values of mixed kinds,
i.e., between intrinsic and instrumental value.
And that, to my way of regard, is something which is importantly new in the
last people example. Agreeing that it is possible for the last people to act badly
if they act in the way Routley describes them, and, further, employing the
intrinsic/instrumental value distinction to elaborate such a conclusion, one
might be inclined to judge that the intrinsic value of some things (say, every
wild animal, the fish of the seas, and all remaining forests, taken collectively)
could well outweigh the admitted instrumental value which would temporarily
obtain25 from a process requiring their permanent destruction. But, of course,
thus far, Routley (1973), himself, has not mentioned intrinsic value.
IV. Four Early Reactions: Benn, Mannison, Callicott, & Elliot
(A) First reactions were local, and remained so until 1979 (six years later).26
After all, ‘Is There A Need...?’ had been published in the relatively inacces-
sible proceedings of a world congress and was thus largely unknown, except
locally. And the jointly authored (with Valerie Routley), yet to be published,
‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’27 (1980) – which “consider-
ably elaborates ... ‘Is There a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?”’28
had only been “read in 1974 at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, at
Notre Dame University, and at ... the University of Victoria, Canada”28.
Otherwise, it too was unknown – except, again, locally.
1974: Hereabouts, however, the last man was much discussed in these
25Remember, these are the last people.
26With the publication of J. Baird Callicott’s discussion paper, ‘Elements of an Environ-
mental Ethic: Moral Considerability and the Biotic Community’, in Volume 1, Number 1
of the new journal, Environmental Ethics.
27By Richard and Val Routley, published in Environmental Philosophy, edited by D.
Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, Monograph Series, No. 2, Dept. of Philosophy,
RSSS, A.N.U. (1980), pp. 96-189. Of which, more later.
28Ibid. The quotation is from p. 96, at footnote * of the article in question.
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early days, as e.g., by Routley’s ANU colleague, Stanley Benn, in his
Presidential Address to the Australasian Association of Philosophy in 1974.
In that address (a version of which was published in 1977)29, Benn favourably
explored the application of a version of it to works of art:
“...part of our concern for the safety and condition of works of
art is on account of the pleasure they give to human beings, and
I cannot show conclusively that is not the whole of it. But it
is at least plausible to claim that, if the entire human species,
together with such other persons as there may be, were doomed
to certain destruction next Christmas Day, then, for anyone who
cared about works of art the simultaneous destruction of some
outstanding pieces would be a cause for additional regret, not
the matter of indifference it would be were this concern wholly
anthropocentric.”30
The potential intuition, not – I think – widely shared, whose pumping
was being attempted here was that: perhaps not all the value to be found
in “outstanding pieces” can be accounted for instrumentally – that is, by
reference to its actual and potential causal effects, particularly hedonic effects,
on people.
1975: Don Mannison, a philosopher from the University of Queensland,
journeyed down to ANU in 1975 to present his own rather more critical31
views (subsequently published in 1980).32
“Benn in ‘Personal Freedom and Environmental Ethics’, a paper
in which he was explicitly defending human chauvinism, accepts
for works of art what the Routleys have called ‘the last man
argument’. Briefly, the Last Man Argument is the allegation that
it would be morally impermissible to destroy, say, a forest, even
if one knew that one was the last person alive, and that one was
going to die in a moment. Now, Benn believes that this argument,
29Stanley Benn, ‘Personal Freedom and Environmental Ethics: The Moral Inequality of
Species’ in Equality and Freedom: International and Comparative Jurisprudence, Vol.2, pp.
401-424. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1977.
30Ibid., p. 413.
31“I am”, said Don, “for the time being, a human chauvinist.” (p. 53) And then, “I
commit myself to the view that a world sans valuers is eo ipso a world sans values.” (p.
62) [See the following footnote for the full reference.]
32Don Mannison, ‘A Critique of a Proposal for an “Environmental Ethic”: Just Why
is it “Bad” to Live in a “Concrete Jungle”?’, in Environmental Philosophy, Monograph
Series, No. 2; Department of Philosophy, RSSS, ANU (1980), pp. 52-64.
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when applied to works of art, shows that even a fundamentally
person-oriented ethic is not ‘wholly anthropocentric’.
But exactly what is the force of and basis for such an argument?
It is – and I think it would be conceded to be – an appeal to one’s
‘intuitions’; i.e. to the ‘feel’ of such possible situations. What
would – or could – be said to someone, or to a large group of
people, who did not share the intuition? Following the moral
intuitionism of A.C. Ewing, would we say that they are ‘morally
immature’? But, what apart from their ‘coming to see’ what we
‘see’ would or could count as being morally mature? ...
What has to be shown, I think, is not that a survey shows that
people will tend to answer one way rather than another, but
that one response rather than another is the right one. This
is particularly, and inescapably, true for anyone who, like the
Routleys, {wants to defend a realist theory of values; i.e., a
theory of values that accounts for the truth of ‘x has value’ with
no ineliminable reference to the interests and concerns of the
evaluating group.}”33 (56-7)
Actually, Routley (1973) does not refer to the last man itself as an ‘argument’,
but as a ‘counter example’.34 Yet – assuming that normative statements can
33The Routleys (in 1980, p. 154, fn. 63) directly cite the passage marked by “{. . . }”,
and reject the charge of ‘realism’. More of all that later.
34However, in the later ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’ (1980), the
Routleys do refer to “the last man argument”, p. 128 of Environmental Ethics, eds.
Mannison, McRobbie, Routley. Much later – in ‘On the Value Core of Deep-Green Theory’
in Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand Society, eds. G. Oddie and R. Perrett, OUP (1992),
p. 223 – Richard refers to it as a “thought-experiment”. It is all of these things. Still later,
in The Greening of Ethics (1994), speaking about “ways into greener ethics”, he writes:
“One is from deep moral attitudes, drawn out (or awakened, even ‘remem-
bered’ in Socrates’ terms) by decisive examples, such as that of the Last
Person.” (34)
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be either true35 or false (or some analogue thereof) – it is fair enough to
regard it as being an embedded ingredient in an argument of modus tollens
form:
FP → PE(LM )36
∼PE(LM )
∴ ∼FP
Mannison accepts the first premise, but finds himself unconvinced of the
second. He suggests that being convinced of it may be at least in part a
matter of feeling (“the ‘feel’ of such possible situations”), and this too is
perhaps fair-ish to Richard, since he had written (1973) with regret that:
“. . .men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a
wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it
will yield, and then move on; and such conduct. . . does not rouse
the moral indignation of others.”37 (13)
But, in any event, Routley (1973) is not much interested in such dallying by
such convictional or epistemological way-sides. Instead, he is ready to move
on to determining the outlines of “a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental
ethic.” (18)
1979: So far as I am aware, the first overseas discussion38 of the last man
35As the Routleys (1980) seem to assume (op. cit., p. 155; p. 164, fn. 78), thus making
them something like ‘moral realists’ in the sense of that notion as advocated by Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral Realism (Cornell U. Pr., 1988), p. 5:
“[R]ealism involves embracing just two theses: (1) the claims in question,
when literally construed, are literally true or false (cognitivism), and (2) some
are literally true. Nothing more. (Of course, a great deal is built into these
two theses.)”
But only ‘something like’, since – for reasons to be advanced later in this paper - they do
not ultimately regard themselves as ‘cognitivists’ with respect to claims of intrinsic value.
36Where, as before, “PE” stands for “it is morally permissible that”.
37There will be more to say about this aspect of Routley’s environmental perspective
when we come to discuss the jointly authored ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental
Ethics’ (1980). In the meantime, cp. Leopold’s early remark: “No important change
in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis,
loyalties, affections, and convictions.” And this one as well: “It is inconceivable to me that
an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land. . . .” (A
Sand County Almanac, OUP 1949, pp. 209-10, and p. 223.)
38Apart from an extensive one presented by Richard and Val Routley themselves in the
U.S. and Canada in 1974 (and again in Australia in 1977), and finally published in 1980 –
of which more later.
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example as originally provided (in 1973) by Richard is to be found six years
later in the very first issue of the new journal Environmental Ethics. Its
author is J. Baird Callicott.39
“...Routley presents some ingenious limiting case paradigms, in-
volving situations so construed as to eliminate consideration of
other people, but not of trees, whales, rivers, or other nonhuman
natural entities. For example, Routley asks us to consider the
‘last man’ (‘who lays about him eliminating, as far as he can,
every living thing, animal or plant’) or ‘the last people’. Sup-
pose that after the proliferation of nuclear power plants it is
discovered that radiation side effects have blocked any chance of
human reproduction. In bitterness, the last generation of people
set about systematically destroying all life on the planet. Since
future persons, posterity, are in principle removed from consider-
ation, Routley argues that according to dominant Western ethical
traditions, what the last people do to the natural environment is
not wrong or morally censurable.”40
We have already seen that part of this understanding of the last people
example must be rejected. For there is no mention of a motivating bitterness
on the part of the last people, and quite deliberately so, for according to
Routley:
“...the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the
last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with
stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be
removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic
principle, [to] the effect (3) that he does not willfully destroy
natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources
willfully, but perhaps ‘for the best of reasons’, the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.”41
As we have seen, Routley’s last people case, which allows that the last people
39The last time I looked (admittedly, a while back), all of Callicott’s then 60 publications
registered in the Philosopher’s Index were in environmental philosophy. It is a tribute to
Richard Routley that his ‘Is There a Need...’-piece operated as an original stimulus on
the thinking and productivity of one of the very most productive, and most discussed, of
American environmental philosophers.
40J. Baird Callicott, ‘Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability and
the Biotic Community’, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1979), pp. 71-72.
Italics in the original.
41Routley, op. cit., p. 17.
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“are simply satisfying reasonable needs”, thereby allows a limited kind of
comparison between values of mixed kinds, i.e., between intrinsic42 and
instrumental values. Restructuring the case in the way Callicott casually
does – such that the motives of the last people turn out to be simple bitterness
– would not allow such a comparison, for such a motive would seem to count
as merely ‘willful’.
In spite of this false start, Callicott accepts what I have earlier called ‘the
negative work’ of the last man example.43 He remarks:
“...it is a challenge, which I have been unable to meet, to find
a major European ethical system, classical or modern, which
meets the test of Routley’s limiting case paradigms. In every
system it is at best other persons, and often only the agent’s own
self, which count for something, while nonhuman natural entities
are included in moral reckoning only in relation to persons as
property or as being involved in a general and vague conception
of the quality of (human) life.”44
Callicott then takes up the question of the character of the new environmental
ethic45 which, it seems, is required in order to theorize the newly recognised
impermissibilities with respect to the environment which Routley claims to
be tracking. In the course of doing this, he does proffer one quite interesting
remark:
“If an environmental ethic is to be an ethic proper, not a com-
42Although, thus far, Routley (1973), himself, has not mentioned intrinsic values.
43I wrote:
“...the work of the last man example is, thus far, merely negative: there is an
identifiable core principle embedded in Western ethical systems, and the last
man example shows it up as an unacceptable principle. But as the identity
of ethical systems must be a matter of the identity of their core principles,
to find a reason to reject a core principle of any system is to find a reason to
reject the system itself.”
44Callicott, op. cit., p. 72, fn. 3. In support of this view, he cites the concurrence of
Holmes Rolston III: “Our ethical heritage largely attaches values and rights to persons,
and if nonpersonal realms enter, they enter only as tributary to the personal.” (‘Is There
An Ecological Ethics?’, Ethics 85 (1975): 101). But cp. Maimonides (1135-1204): “It
should not be believed that all beings exist for the sake of the existence of man. On the
contrary, all the other beings, too, have been intended for their own sakes and not for the
sake of something else.” (The Guide for the Perplexed, I:72) -And then there is the less
ambitious Mr. Bentham.
45“. . . let us ask what such an ethics might be like.” (Ibid., p. 72)
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plication of familiar prudential considerations..., it has to be
internally articulated46 in such a way as to confer more than
mere instrumental value upon nonhuman natural entities.”47
The “internal articulation” of the new environmental ethic, says Callicott,
must refer to a value of nonhuman natural entities which is not merely
instrumental. The obvious alterity here is intrinsic value, the sort of value
Moore thought the method of isolation revealed.
(B) In 1978, Robert Elliot commented upon the last people example. This
he did in a paper entitled, ‘Why Preserve Species?’.48 In it, he cites49 a slightly
different (and presumably later) version of the example, a version apparently
intended for inclusion in Richard and Val Routley’s (1979) ‘Against the
Inevitability of Human Chauvinism’50:
“I [Elliot] want now to consider some arguments proposed by
Richard and Val Routley which...describe a range of possible
situations where our intuitions tell us one thing but traditional
ethics allegedly tell us another. I want to consider...the ‘last
people’ example. A group of people know themselves to be the
last people who will inhabit the earth. They proceed to act in
the following way.
‘They humanely exterminate every wild animal and
they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable
land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining
forests disappear in favour of pastures or plantations ...
On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved
very badly; they have done what is impermissible and
46Is he referring here to the need for a particular kind of meta-ethic (e.g. one making
reference to intrinsic value)?
47Ibid., p. 78.
48Presented to a relatively early Environmental Philosophy Conference held at the
Australian National University in October, 1978, and published in its edited proceedings
two years later: Environmental Philosophy, edited by D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and
R. Routley, Monograph Series, No. 2, Dept. of Philosophy, RSSS, A.N.U. (1980), pp.
8-29. The first such conference in Australia was held at the University of Queensland in
1977. The first in the U.S. was held at the University of Georgia in 1971.
49On page 23 of his article.
50Published in Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, eds. K. E. Goodpaster and K.
M. Sayre, University of Notre Dame Pr., 1979, pp. 36-59 (reprinted in Environmental
Ethics, ed. Robert Elliot, OUP (1995), pp. 104-128). Intended the version may have been
but, ultimately, it was not included in this article. There is no mention of the last people
in the Routleys’ article in Goodpaster and Sayre, eds. (1979).
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destroyed much of value; for they have simplified and
largely destroyed all the natural eco-systems, and with
their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely
wrecked place.’”51 (23)
Unlike Callicott, Elliot is unconvinced that the example succeeds in its
negative employment of finding a reason to reject all traditional ethics. As
he puts it:
“Whether the Routleys’ remarks are fair to traditional ethics is
doubtful; for instance various utilitarian theories would seem to
deliver the right judgement in [this] case.”52
Elliot appears to have preference utilitarianism in mind. As he had put
matters a few pages earlier,
“For the preference utilitarian states of affairs have value if they
objectively satisfy the desires of individuals: whether any sub-
jective or felt satisfaction is derived is beside the point. Thus
if Richard Routley desires, in 1978, that substantial stands of
mountain ash remain in 2078, then that is a reason53 for assigning
value to those states of affairs which include the existence, in
2078, of stands of mountain ash. On a classical utilitarian theory
there is no reason for assigning value to that state of affairs unless
it produces subjective or felt satisfaction.”54
Preference utilitarianism, while not ‘classical’, may nevertheless be regarded
as ‘traditional’; and therefore not ‘new’. And, yet, in spite of its being some
part of ‘the tradition’, we see it in this instance producing the environmentally
correct result.
Such rescue of tradition appears, however, to forget the sense of ‘the new’
which Routley has deployed. According to that sense, an ethic will be
appropriately ‘new’, provided – as we have seen – that it does not accept the
freedom principle, in other words, does not accept basic human chauvinism.
51The differences between this later version, and the original 1973 version are indicated
in italics. They are additions. This version is, however, nearly identical to that version
which was to appear in ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’ (1980) – of
which more later. (There were copies of early versions of the 1980 article floating around
Australian departments of philosophy at this time, viz., 1978.)
52Elliot, op. cit., p. 23.
53Richard could not agree that this, by itself, was a reason. Much as he might like it to
be. To agree would be to succumb to a form of subjectivism.
54Elliot, op. cit., p. 20.
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But whether or not preference utilitarianism accepts the freedom principle
depends entirely on the content of preferences. If current preferences are –
as it largely happens – unrestricted by anything other than the very liberal
‘freedom principle’, then the preference utilitarian must, at least for the time
being, in effect, credit that principle. There is thus no refuge in ‘preference’
utilitarianism from the ravages of basic human chauvinism. This is a point
which Routley (1973) made, so I believe, when he wrote:
“...it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand
(horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the
economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in
outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base
class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot
that they do then ‘rational’ economic decision-making would do
nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale
survives should not have to depend on what humans know or
what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are
far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on
what is environmentally desirable.”55
His point, which is perfectly well-taken at least from the general point of
view likely to be sponsored by an environmental ethic, nevertheless suggests
difficult questions of a meta-ethical kind. Thus, following what I take
to be Richard’s lead here: Suppose (1) that preference utilitarianism is
to be rejected as unhelpfully ‘old’ just because it is compatible with the
freedom principle (i.e., just because it subscribes to the freedom principle if
people actually prefer a world in which the freedom principle is a governing
principle56); and suppose (2) that the value of wilderness, say, is therefore
not to be decided on the preferences. That is, the relational ground that
the continued existence of wilderness objectively satisfies preferences (if that
is the case) is not to be thought of as adequate in establishing the value of
wilderness, because the availability of such preferences and therefore of such
a foundation is utterly contingent on such things as what people “see on
television”. But if preferences, themselves subjective phenomena, are not
decisive in the establishment of value – because, being decisive, there might
55Routley, op. cit., p. 20. The passage was deemed important enough to be largely
preserved in R. & V. Routley (1980): 184.
56Remember, even though the last man need not live to be pleased by it (provided we
construct the example aright: let him therefore have arranged that the elimination of all
things should commence shortly after his death), his preferences are objectively satisfied
by the destruction of all living things.
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be a resultant subscription to the freedom principle (or worse!) – one is
tempted to wonder whether such an environmental ethic can avoid embracing
some kind of objectivism.57
However, let us assume, for the moment at least, that it can. In that case
it seems its subjectivism must take a particular form. Elliot addresses the
matter of the particular form a subjectivism must take in order to satisfy the
demands of an environmental ethic which is, itself, sensitive to the demands
of the last man and the last people examples.
“A subjectivist account of value...links58 value with the existence59
of individuals capable of valuing. The idea is that value only
comes into the world if such individuals exist and if they place
value on certain kinds of things.60 ... There is one point that
needs stressing. Given the account I have offered of value it does
not follow that if X has value at t1 there is an individual who
either values X or is disposed to value X at t1.61 All that is
57It may not be entirely clear what this has to do with the last man and last people
examples. Here is how the argument has gone – in a nutshell.
The last man and last people example (allegedly) show up the freedom principle as
inadequate; they thereby similarly show ‘basic human chauvinism’ to be inadequate.
But preference utilitarianism is compatible with the freedom principle. So preference
utilitarianism is to be given up: i.e., even the ‘objective satisfaction’ of preference is not
determinative of value. Therefore, preferences themselves, it would seem, can play no
determinative role in the establishment of value from the point of view of an environmental
ethic that is well-defended. But if this is so, how is one – as a well-defended environmental
ethicist – to avoid giving up ‘subjectivism’ (anthropogenesis) and embracing ‘objectivism’
(cosmogenesis), with respect to value.
58This, of course, is vague. Links how? In saying what he says here, Elliot is not requiring
of subjectivist accounts of value that they ‘reduce’ value to evaluations. Elsewhere, however,
he does.
“. . . the subjectivist view makes the valuer the sole determinant of a thing’s
value; whether X is valuable is determined by whether it is valued.” (Elliot,
op. cit., p. 19)
59This (“existence”) will be a point of difference between Elliot (1978) and the Routleys
(1980).
60Elliot’s meaning is slightly unclear here. However, I take “only...if” to be governing
both appearances of “if” (so that we have two necessary conditions presented).
61At this point, Elliot writes ambiguously. On one natural reading, supposing you are
the last person and that, contra Routley’s last man, you value there being wilderness after
you are gone, then, ex hypothesi, you value X at t1 even though your evaluative act takes
place prior to t1. Thus, an English version not so easy to misread would be: “...it does not
follow that if X has value at t1, then at t1 there is an individual who either values X or is
disposed to value X at t1”. Still, the following context makes his meaning clear enough.
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required is that at some time or other there exists an individual
who values X. It does not matter whether that individual predates
or postdates X: it does not matter whether or not X and whatever
values X have temporal-parts which overlap. ... The strength of
this kind of subjectivism over and above the more restricted kind
is that it allows that certain states of affairs have intrinsic value
even though valuers are absent from them. Thus this account
of value provides some kind of support for Routley’s last man
argument....”62
I think it is clear that Elliot is correct in thinking that any subjectivism
seeking application as the correct meta-ethic for an environmental ethic
which is itself responsive to the lessons of the last man example must be of
this less restricted kind. Otherwise, if the evaluating subject is required to be
evaluating the object at the same time that it is of value, then given there will
be no evaluators after the death of the last man, the impoverished landscape
he leaves behind will have no relative disvalue (compared to the biologically
rich and varied landscape he might have left behind), and consequently
the last man (or last people) will have done no wrong. Similarly, for an
‘environmentally friendly’ last man: if the evaluating subject is required to
be evaluating the object at the same time that it is of value, then given that
there will be no evaluators after the death of the environmentally friendly
last man, the rich, wild landscape this last man leaves in place will have no
relative value compared to the impoverished one he might have left behind,
and the environmentally friendly last man will have acted no better in his
final moment than the king of disaster.
62Elliot, op. cit., pp. 19-20. But the support it provides is not support the Routleys
(1980) wish to make use of, since they reject ‘subjectivism’:
“Values...are features objects may have or lack; they are not subjective, they
are not features which reduce to states or conditions of subjects or valuers.” [R.
& V. Routley (1980), p. 154]
The view that subjectivism is a reductionist thesis is, I think, a correct one; and can
provide an understandable motive for its abandonment. Neither, however, do the Routleys
(1980) regard values as objective features of objects. They take it that a false dichotomy
(‘subjectivism or else objectivism’) has been forced upon such discussions. One reason for
rejecting objectivism is “Objectivism forces intuitionism”. [R. & V. Routley (1980): 154.]
More of this matter, and their tertium quid, nonjectivism, later.
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V. Meanwhile back at the station
Both Richard and Val Routley had, since Richard’s six page address to
the world congress in 1973, been elaborating ‘Is There a Need...’ – at
considerable length, as it turned out. In 1974, a draft of the new paper
was read at Indiana, Notre Dame, and University of Victoria, Canada; and
then – “sizeable additions [having] been made, with a view to increasing the
intelligibility and enlarging the scope of the original draft, and meeting some
of the many objections”63 – the completed and lengthy (94 pages) paper,
‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’, was published in 1980.64
The “liberal” freedom principle (FP) appears once again, exactly as before,
with only its name changed:
“(D) ‘...one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1)
that he does not harm others {and (2) that he is not likely to
harm himself irreparably}.’ ”65
Again, it is said to be one of the “core principles of Western ethical systems,
[these being] principles that will accordingly belong to the super-ethic”.66
However, instead of calling this principle basic human chauvinism (as before),
it is now said to “incorporate fundamental features of (human or person)
chauvinism” (117), where the latter is newly identified in the following way:
“Human chauvinism is class chauvinism where the class is hu-
mans.... Class chauvinism...is substantially differential, discrim-
inatory and inferior treatment (by sufficiently many members
of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not
sufficient justification.”67
63Vide R. & V. Routley (1980). The quotation is from the opening footnote on p. 96.
64R. & V. Routley (1980), ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’, in Environ-
mental Philosophy, edited by D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, Monograph
Series, No. 2, Department of Philosophy, RSSS, A.N.U. (1980), pp. 96-189.
65Ibid., p. 117. The second clause is put in curly brackets by the Routleys, to mark the
fact that Mill rejected it, and its deletion “does not affect the general argument” (p. 117,
fn. 21) to come – which is deployed against (D).
66A passage which appears in both ‘Is There a Need...’ (15), and ‘Human Chauvinism
and Environmental Ethics’ (116).
67Ibid., p. 96. On the same page, they also refer to human chauvinism as ‘anthropocen-
tricism’. Other statements of relevance in the article as to the nature of human chauvinism
include:
(1) ”The basic assumption [of Western human chauvinism] is that value attaches
essentially only to humans or to what serves or bears on human interests, or
derivatively, to items which derive from human skill, ingenuity or labour. Since
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But this change does not seem to make any appreciable difference in lessons
to be drawn.
Now, (D) is a deontic principle specifying the class of permissible actions.
It has the form: “Anything goes, except....”. But there is also68 an equally
fundamental (or core) “axiological principle corresponding to (D)” (119), viz.,
(A) “Only those objects which are of use or concern to humans
(or persons), or which are the product of human (or person)
labour or ingenuity, are of value; thus these are all that need to
be taken into account in determining best choice or best course
of action, what is good, etc.”69
And, at this point, the Routleys now reproduce the last man and the last
people examples as counter examples to the fundamental deontic principle (D)
and, as well, against the equally fundamental and corresponding axiological
principle (A).70
(i) “The last man example. The last man (or woman or person)
surviving the collapse of the world system sets to work eliminating,
as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly
if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite
permissible according to principle (D) but on environmental
natural items have no other value, there is no restriction on the way they are
treated insofar as this does not interfere with others; as far as isolated natural
things are concerned anything is permissible.” [R. & V. Routley (1980), p.
109.]
The use of “isolated” triggers memories of Moore and, along with the use of “other”,
prefigures a move to intrinsic value. More on that later.
(2) “...the strong thesis of human chauvinism, according to which items outside
the privileged human class have no value except one as instrumental value.”
[R. & V. Routley (1980), p. 115.]
68And this is new, i.e., it was not in Routley (1973).
69Op. cit., p. 119. (A) is very familiar. Compare (A) with Mill:
“...all desirable things...are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in them-
selves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.”
Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch. 2, Para. 2/25.
There is no question that Mill is using “desirable things” in this passage to include
‘valuable things’, or ‘objects of value’ as per principle (A). It is also useful to compare (A)
with passages (1) and (2) in footnote 67.
70“The counterexamples to (D) and (A) presented depend largely on designing situations
different from the actual where there are either too few or too many humans or persons.”
(Ibid., 121)
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grounds what he does is wrong.”71
Once again, what the last man, himself, has done is wrong, and this is simply
because, according to the Routleys, he has destroyed “things of value”. (121)
As can be seen, this presentation of the last man (pp. 121-2) is nearly
identical to that appearing in 1973, except that there is this additional note:
“The usual vandalism charge does not apply against Mr. Last
Man since he does no damage to others.” (122)
Indeed, if one thinks of vandalism as wrongful destruction, then given some
thought about the limited sense of wrongfulness implicit in principles (D)
and (A), it becomes clear that the charge of vandalism – were it (somewhat
peculiarly and out of confusion about the limited implications of one’s own
principles) to proceed from adherents to the tradition represented by (D)
and (A) – could not stick to the last man.72
The subsection on the last people reads as follows – with additions and other
changes (relative to the 1973 text) appearing in curly brackets:
(ii) “The last people example. The last man example can be
{extended} to the last people example. We can assume that they
know they are the last people, e.g., because they are aware that
radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One
considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that
71Ibid.
72Bentham’s understanding of wrongful destruction – a traditional understanding – is
instructive in this matter insofar as he regards it as an offence, first of all, against property
and, in particular, as an offence against the property of another :
“When any object which you have had the physical occupation or enjoyment
of, ceases, in any degree, in consequence of the act of another man, and
without any change made in so much of that power as depends upon the
intrinsic physical condition of your person, to be subject to that power; this
cessation is either owing to change in the intrinsic condition of the thing
itself, or in its exterior situation with respect to you, that is, to its being
situated out of your reach. In the former case, the nature of the change is
either such as to put it out of your power to make any use of it at all, in
which case the thing is said to be destroyed, and the offence whereby it is
so treated may be termed wrongful destruction: or such only as to render
the uses it is capable of being put to of less value than before, in which case
it is said to be damaged, or to have sustained damage, and the offence may
be termed wrongful endamagement.” [Bentham, Principles of Morals and
Legislation, Ch. 16 (‘Division of Offences’), Sec. 35, para 2/6. My italics.]
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what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes
with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science
fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its
ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the
planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting
the lesser traditions, just for the {sheer enjoyment} of it.
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They
humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the
fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation,
and all remaining natural forests disappear in favour of {pastures}
or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons
for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection,
or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it
is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that
they do not worry too much about their impending extinction.
On an environmental ethics the last people have behaved badly;
{they have done what is impermissible and destroyed much of
value; for} they have simplified and largely destroyed all the
natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon
be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may
conform with {the core principles (D) and (A)}, and as well
with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions {under more
obvious construals of these principles}. Indeed the main point of
elaborating this {extension of the last man} example is because
{principles (D) and (A)} may, {as they stand, appear to} conflict
with stewardship, cooperation {and perfection positions}, as the
last man example reveals. The {apparent} conflict {between these
positions and principle (D)} may be {definitively} removed, it
seems, by conjoining a further proviso to the principle, [to] the
effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But
as the last people {who are not vandals} do not destroy resources
wilfully, but perhaps ‘for the best of reasons’, the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.”73
73Richard and Val Routley, op. cit., p. 122. That which is in curly brackets is additional
to the version in R. Routley (1973), or replaces other similar content. The Routleys discuss
other examples (“The great entrepreneur example” in which the “last man is an industrialist”
(123), “The vanishing species example” (123-4), “The factory farm example”(124-5), and
“The wilderness example” (125). The last of these is said to
“. . . require variation, e.g. to a wilderness devoid of sentient individuals, if
it is to counter clearly such extensions of Western ethics as those of animal
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As can be seen, the subsection on the last people contains no sub-
stantive changes to the material presented in 1973. All changes
(additions/replacements) made are in the service of clarification.
And the upshot is that – as the Routleys (1980) see things – lessons previously
drawn from the last man and the last people were correctly drawn. Thus,
“...what the examples show is that core axiological and deontic
assumptions74 of the Western super-ethic are environmentally
inadequate; and accordingly Western ethics should be superseded
by a more environmentally adequate ethic. ...”75
In other words, and much as before, it follows (courtesy of these examples)
that we know of the new ethic that (i) a need for it has been demonstrated,
that (ii) it will not contain the freedom principle (D) nor (iii) its corre-
sponding axiological principle (A), and that (iv) it offers (or will offer)
“environmental grounds” for morally assessing action. But, to this point in
the article, the contentful and justificatory character of the new ethic is so
far unspecified.76
Earlier, I noted that Richard had not, in his original (1973) discussion of
the last man and last people examples, deployed the notion of the intrinsic
value of, e.g., “living things”. Instead, the possible meta-content of the new
environmental ethic was left entirely unspecified apart from a very tentative
suggestion as to how the freedom principle might be further restricted utilizing
the notion of subjunctively possible instrumental value. Routley was not
happy with this manoeuvre, “in view of the way the freedom principle sets
the onus of proof” (18). This concern constituted a kind of pragmatic or
even political justification for his subsequent proposal (1973) that it might
be better, simply, “to scrap it77 altogether” (18) rather than trying to further
hedge it in.78
liberationist. For this sort of reason we do not want to overstate or overrate the
role of particular examples – as distinct from variations upon such examples.”
(125)
In fact, this caution will take on an importance later (see ‘(N)’ – the statement of
‘nonjectivism’ – below, and the attendant fn. 115).
74Namely, (A) and (D) respectively.
75Ibid., p. 126.
76But the rest of the paragraph begins to change this lack of specification, as we shall
shortly see.
77The freedom principle (FP).
78On the other hand, by 1980, he and Val are, it seems, much inclined to regard the early
proposal that wilderness has an instrumental value for “purely hypothetical experiencers
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But, now, in the concluding sentence of the paragraph just quoted – about
lessons previously drawn from the last man and the last people being correctly
drawn, there is this novelty:
“The class of permissible actions that rebound on the environ-
ment is more narrowly circumscribed on such an environmental
ethic than it is in the Western superethic, and the class of nonin-
strumentally valuable objects is correspondingly wider than it is
on the Western super-ethic.”79
This is the first instance – now some 7 years after the publication of ‘Is There A
Need...?’ – that there is an explicit reference from Richard to noninstrumental
value, although as noticed earlier (see footnote 22), Val Routley in her
excellent ‘Critical Notice’ of Passmore’s Man’s Responsibility for Nature
(1974) had criticized Passmore for not seriously discussing the intrinsic
value hypothesis as part of the ‘new ethic’ (even though this hypothesis, so
contextualized, had not thus far been aired in publication by either of the
Routleys). And, of course, as we have seen, others – in their discussions of
the implications of the last man – had been remarking upon the need for its
introduction, in particular, Elliot (1978)80 and Callicott (1979)81.
(who may vanish into counterfactuals)” – i.e., has a ‘subjunctively possible instrumental
value’, as I put it – as “a disguised intrinsic value position”, and thus, apart from the
disguise, on the right track. [R. & V. Routley (1980): 137] The ‘scrapped’ position seems
to be very similar, possibly identical, to Rescher’s:
“...the unseen sunset has aesthetic value because of the potential benefits
it affords ... [i.e.] if someone were placed on to such a world, he would be
able to appreciate and enjoy this sunset.” [N. Rescher, Introduction to Value
Theory, Prentice Hill, 1969, pp. 136-7; as cited by R. & V. Routley (1980):
156.]
I think, however, that such a suggestion is not at all a disguised intrinsic value theory;
rather, it extends human chauvinism into the domain of possible worlds. What the last
man would be required to save by an environmental ethic hostage to the further hypothesis
of subjunctively possible instrumental value might still not be nearly as extensive as what
he would be required to save on an environmental ethic based on intrinsic value.
79R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 126.
80Elliot, commenting upon the unrestricted form of subjectivism he favored, had written:
“The strength of this kind of subjectivism over and above the more restricted
kind is that it allows that certain states of affairs have intrinsic value even
though valuers are absent from them. Thus this account of value provides
some kind of support for Routley’s last man argument.” (Elliot, op. cit., pp.
19-20.)
81Callicott:
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Now, seven years on, Richard and Val, working together, are ready to
undisguisedly ‘go for’ intrinsic value in order to flesh out the character of the
new, and necessary, environmental ethic. Intrinsic value is brought into their
discussion, explicitly, for the first time, in a series of real world examples said
to show the
“...very great differences in the practical valuations and behaviour
of those who believe that natural items can have value and create
obligations not reducible (in any way) to human interests and
those who do not.... (129)
Example 1. ... C. Stone...notes82 the practical legal differences
between taking the damage to a polluted river as affecting its
intrinsic value, and taking it as just affecting human river users.
In the one case one will see adequate compensation as restoring
the original state of the river ...and in the other as compensating
those present (or future) humans who will suffer from its pollution.
As Stone points out, the sum adequate to compensate the latter
may well be much less than that required to restore the river to
its unpolluted state, thus making it economic, and in terms of
the human chauvinist theory, fair and reasonable, to compensate
those damaged and continue pollution of the river. In the first
case, of course, adequate compensation or restoration for the harm
done would have to consist in restoring the river to its unpolluted
condition and will not just be paid to the people affected. ...
In the case of a natural item damage may be compensated by
payment to a trust set up to protect and restore it. (129-30)
Example 2. The believer in intrinsic values may avoid making
unnecessary and excessive noise in the forest, out of respect for
the forest and its nonhuman inhabitants. She will do this even
when it is certain that there is no other human around to know
the difference. For one to whom the forest and its inhabitants
are merely another conventional utility, however, there will be
no such constraint. He may avoid unnecessary noise if he thinks
“If an environmental ethic is to be an ethic proper, not a complication of
familiar prudential considerations..., it has to be internally articulated in
such a way as to confer more than mere instrumental value upon nonhuman
natural entities.” [Op. cit., p. 78]
82In Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Avon Books,
New York, 1975.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 4.2
543
it will disturb other humans, but if he is certain none are about
to hear him he will feel at liberty to make as much and as loud
a noise as he chooses, and this will affect his behaviour. ... To
claim that the making of noise in such circumstances is a matter
of no importance, and therefore there is no important difference
in behaviour, is of course to assess the matter through human
chauvinist eyes. So such a claim is question-begging. From the
intrinsic viewpoint it would make a difference, and be reflected
in practical behavioural difference. (130)
Example 3. Consider an aboriginal tribe which holds a particular
place to be sacred, and where this sanctity and intrinsic valu-
ableness and beauty is celebrated by a number of beautiful cave
paintings. A typically ‘progressive’ instrumentalist Western view
would hold the cave (and perhaps place) to be worth preserva-
tion because of its value to the aboriginal people, and because
of the artistic merit of the human artifacts, the cave paintings
the cave contained. To the ‘enlightened’ Westerner, if the tribe
should cease to exist, and the paintings be destroyed, it would
be permissible to destroy the place if this should be in what is
judged to be the best interests of human kind, e.g. to get at the
uranium underneath. To the aboriginal...the obligation to the
place would not die [merely] because the tribe disappeared or
declined. Similarly no ordinary sum of money would be able to
compensate for the loss of such a place, in the way that it might
for something conceived of as a utility or convenience, as having
value only because of the benefits it confers on the ‘users’ of it.”
(130-31)
The Routleys conclude:
“There is an enormous felt or emotive difference between feeling
that a place should be valued or respected for itself, for its
perceived beauty and character, and feeling that it should not be
defaced because it is valued by one’s fellow humans, and provides
pleasurable sensations or money or convenience for them. ...
These differences in emotional presentation83 are accompanied
by or expressed by an enormous range of behavioural differences,
83The idea of emotional presentation – borrowed from Meinong – played an important
role in Richard’s later thought about how values are determined by valuers. We will come
to this – see section VIII.
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of which the examples given represent only a very small sample.
The sort of behaviour warranted by each viewpoint and thought
admissible by it, the concept of what one is free to do, for example,
will normally be very different. It is certainly no coincidence
that cultures holding to the intrinsic view have normally been
far less destructive of nature than the dominant Western human
chauvinist culture.”84
From all this, it becomes clear that any initial hesitation (or seven year itch)
– on Richard’s part in thinking of the new, environmental ethic as one which,
if adequate, will deploy the concept of the intrinsic value of things in nature
– has been left behind (or finally scratched), and that the last man and last
people examples have eventually driven him, as ‘the method of isolation’
did the early G. E. Moore, to the view that the natural world, or at least
portions of it,85 possess intrinsic value. Moreover, as the previous lengthy
passage also shows, the Routleys offer reason to think that a recognition
of the intrinsic value of portions of the natural world (or even a belief that
portions of the natural world are intrinsically valuable) must normally be
expected to result in many differences in practise towards them – owing to
the differences in behavioural patterns warranted or found admissible by such
a view, differences revealed when compared to behaviour patterns warranted
or found admissible by an alternative view which takes those portions of
nature to have a merely instrumental kind of value.
Minimally, the last man and last people examples are effective ‘intuition
pumps’ in revealing to many that, at bottom, they simply do intrinsically
value portions of the natural world. This fact may come as a surprise to
some of those to whom it is so revealed, but an intuition pump worth its salt
can do that.86 Moreover, for many, even examples 1, 2, & 3 (above) may –
each of them, or else some one of them – serve much the same purpose. The
particularly interesting thing about the third of these examples, especially at
that point where the Routleys write,
84R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 129-131. The underlinings are theirs.
85I suspect even the most ardent of environmentalists will find it a peculiar notion to
think of those vast regions of molten rock in the interior of the earth as possessing intrinsic
value – even though there is clearly no denying their natural status (nor of course their
enormous instrumental value).
86Much later, Richard Sylvan and David Bennett suggested that a “way into greener
ethics...is from deep moral attitudes, drawn out (or awakened, even ‘remembered’ in
Socrates’ terms) by decisive examples, such as that of the Last Person”. [Sylvan and
Bennett (1994), p. 34.]
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 4.2
545
“...to the aboriginal...the obligation to the place would not die
because the tribe disappeared or declined” (131)
is that it is working very much along the lines of a last people example
– except that this version plays upon our empathy, rather than upon our
antipathy as does the original last people example.
Stories drawn from possible worlds specifically designed to function as in-
tuition pumps, as well as the more prosaic examples of real differences in
behaviour which real differences in belief might be expected to make, can each
reveal to us, minimally, the content and character of our own evaluatings.
On a subjectivist theory of value, specifically, a theory which has it that:
(S1) Things in the world really are of value, if and only if they
are valued by some evaluator,
it turns out (minimally) that wilderness, say, is really valuable if someone
values it, and nobody disvalues it; and is really intrinsically valuable if
someone values it intrinsically and nobody assigns it a negative intrinsic
value. That’s the clear case.
The situation may seem somewhat more problematic if (as is probably the
case) some intrinsically value it, while others assign it a negative intrinsic
value. What does the logic of value assignment, i.e., the logic of subjectively-
sourced value, tell us at this point? Do such oppositional assignments cancel
one another out, so that – provided the number and intensity of assignments
on both sides together sum to an equal, but opposite, weight – the net value
of the object is neither positive nor negative? Are value assignments additive
(and subtractive) in this way? Clearly, taking principle (S1) as our guide to
the machinery of subjectivism, there will be no such arithmetic on offer.
Instead, on an absolutist account of value, the subjectivist logic of value
assignment will tell us that the object, in such a case, is both valuable and
vile.87 Alternatively, on a relativist account of value88, the subjectivist will
simply say that ‘X is valuable for A, but vile for B’.
Now the phenomenon of value assignment fosters the general question of
the relationship between assignments of intrinsic value to X, and the giving
87The lurid difficulty of this sort of outcome is no doubt the principal reason subjectivists
are usually not absolutists.
88Not the same thing as a subjectivist account, of course. Nor are all relativist accounts
subjectivist. To appreciate the possibility of this, consider – as an analogy – the possibility
of local physical law.
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of reasons for doing so.89 Clearly, in assigning an instrumental value to
X, it is possible to offer assessable reasons for doing so. Such reasons will,
almost always, refer to some Y, taken to be good in itself, i.e., intrinsically
good, such that X is believed to play a role in the procurement of Y. That is
ultimately what warrants an assignment of instrumental value to X. This style
of reason-giving will not be available in the case of defending, or attempting
to defend, an assignment of intrinsic value to Y. And the question then is
whether there is some other pattern of reason-giving, which is available for
the defense of assignments of intrinsic value.
At one point, the Routleys write:
“A theory of intrinsic value which assigns intrinsic value to wilder-
ness and species of free animals, for good reasons, can be entirely
naturalistic....”90
89Such assignments of value may be thought of, by the objectivist assigner, to be cases
of value-recognition. Still, such a person subsequent to, and consequent upon, the alleged
recognition, now publicly or privately assigns that value to X which he or she thinks
it deserves. Such assignment is a speech act or an act of private judgement, and the
propositional content of the act may elicit calls for its justification; just as the propositional
content of my assignment of the colour brown to my coffee cup may elicit calls for its
justification.
90R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 139. Notice, firstly, the use of “assigns intrinsic value to”
in this passage, which is characteristic of the Routleys – as opposed to more objectivist
locutions such as ‘perceives the intrinsic value in’ or ‘apprehends the intrinsic value in’,
etc. However, in a later article solely authored by Richard, entitled ‘On the Value Core
of Deep-Green Theory’ (1992) (and repeated verbatim in his The Greening of Ethics
(1994) on p. 145), there is this interesting passage embedded in a discussion of ‘emotional
presentation’:
“As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The
basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension
of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what
is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than
what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source
have to be repeated, with heavy emphasis, in respect of emotional presentation.
For example, reliability cannot be guaranteed. Interference with presentation
through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement, or other inputs may render
it dubious or unacceptable; or conditioning may have occurred, including
substantial cultural conditioning (e.g. so that a person is terrified by harmless
spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with
perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over
time and after reflection.” [In G. Oddie & R. Perrett (eds.), Justice, Ethics,
and New Zealand Society (1992); Auckland: OUP, pp. 225-226.]
Secondly, in the passage in which this statement is to be found, the Routleys (1980)
elaborate on the naturalistic character they seek, saying that a theory of intrinsic value
need not
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But what, in any particular case, apart from being ‘naturalistic’, would such
reasons be like? How would such reason-giving proceed?
That instrumental evaluation ultimately requires intrinsic evaluation, and
hence that instrumental value ultimately requires intrinsic value, was a point
approximately recognized by Aristotle.91 The Routleys also accept it:
“Of the many accounts of value that can be adopted on an
environmental ethic, the following has much to recommend it:-
Some values are instrumental, i.e. a means or an instrument to
something else that has value, and some are not, but are non-
instrumental or intrinsic. Some values at least must be intrinsic,
some objects valuable in themselves and not as a means to other
ends.”92
But, presuming this to be so, that can only be a justification for the propo-
sition that something or other must be of intrinsic value if anything is of
instrumental value (and for the proposition that something or other must
be intrinsically valued if anything is instrumentally valued). In the case of
any particular assignment of intrinsic value, it appears to tell us very little
about how to go about justifying such an assignment, presuming this can
actually be done, nor does it inform us of the ground of the possibility (the
how) of adequate justification in such a case.
Such matters must be addressed if claims are going to be made that some
assignments of intrinsic value, say, to wilderness, are made “for good reasons”
(139), particularly if such claims, themselves, are going to be made good.
The Routleys are aware of this:
“...adopt a religious backdrop such as...’Good Stewardship’...or even a semi-
religious framework such as a mystical or superstitious one with taboos and
sacred places as symbolic and ritual elements.” (139)
91Aristotle, Metaphysics 994b9-15. W.D. Ross, tr.
“Further, the final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the
sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is; so that if there
is to be a last term of this sort, the process will not be infinite; but if there
is no such term there will be no final cause. But those who maintain the
infinite series destroy the good without knowing it. Yet no one would try
to do anything if he were not going to come to a limit. Nor would there be
reason in the world; the reasonable man, at least, always acts for a purpose;
and this is a limit, for the end is a limit.”
92R. & V. Routley, op cit., p. 152. Italics theirs.
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“...the issues of what sort of items have or carry noninstrumental
value, and how they obtain it, cannot be escaped indefinitely.
Without the assignment of (intrinsic) value to some items inde-
pendent of the states and conditions of humans, an ethic would
remain within the confines of human chauvinism. But how...is
such an assignment possible, or rational?”93
And the answer? Well...
“Almost anything can be an object of value, but by no means
everything is. Value is distributed unevenly throughout the
universe in something [like] the way that electrical charge is....
[T]he distribution of values (and especially of intrinsic values)
is much more theory (system, or viewpoint) relative94 than the
distribution of charges. For example, on an environmental view,
many of the plants Mr Last Man eliminates have (intrinsic) value,
whereas on animal liberation (usual animal chauvinist) views the
plants have no value if no animals remain: there would be no
similar disagreement about whether the plants were electrically
charged. Evaluative features such as worth, merit, beauty are
features which...do not have a hard observational basis but are
decidedly theory-dependent, though the theories involved are
evaluative in character and not empirical.”95
It begins to look, then, as if any “good reasons” which might be offered for
some particular X’s being of intrinsic value will take the form of being good
reasons offered for a theory (presumably, a theory about what, generally
speaking, is valuable, and why; so a normative theory), within which X,
being of the appropriate kind, must be assigned intrinsic-value status. This
business of offering and assessing reasons for a theory is, of course, something
we are used to. I will return to the issue of “good reasons” in Section VII
(‘What Sort of Items Have Intrinsic Value?’).
93Ibid.
94The relativism subscribed to here includes cultural relativism. See p. 156 where he
refers approvingly to the (thesis of the) “cultural relativity of values”. This commitment
may be thought to pose prima facie difficulties for any potential comparison of his views
about value to usual (i.e., non-relativistic) views about colour.
95Op.cit„ p. 153.
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VI. The Meta of Value
The Routleys’ thoughts – still in ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental
Ethics’ – now turn to the ontology of values.96 In following this discussion, I
want to determine whether and, if so, to what extent, any of the positions
taken are themselves logically forced, or in some way guided, by the last
man.
First of all, like properties and relations (as argued in Richard’s Exploring
Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, 1979), values do not exist (even though they
are “distributed unevenly throughout the universe”). In that earlier very
lengthy work, we read that:
“None but particulars exist, and by no means all of these do.
Particulars, i.e., particular items, accordingly divide into entities,
those which exist at some time, and non-entities, those which do
not exist at any time....”97
Similarly, in ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’ (1980), we
read – with some significant additional elaboration – that:
“To assert that value or redness or remoteness is distributed
through the universe is not to imply that these features, value or
redness or remoteness, exist, or are to be found in the universe.
[fn. 61] The position is that for properties and relations argued
in R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond...1979.
Such objects98 do not exist, but they have important theoretical,
explanatory, and other roles.” (153-54)
That values are not entities, and therefore do not exist (or are not to be
found in the universe) is a point which he thinks:
“...undermines much criticism of nonsubjective values; for exam-
ple, Mackie’s empiricist case is premised on the false assumption
that the existence of values is necessary to objectivism, which he
does not distinguish from nonsubjectivism. Mackie’s ‘argument
from queerness’ is similarly broken at the outset: since values are
not entities at all, they are not strange sorts of entities. To see
96A discussion which had been brewing since Mannison’s early charge of realism.
97R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1979), p. 7. Underlinings
present in original.
98Here, a technical term – including, as indicated, ‘features’ such as value, redness, and
remoteness.
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how unpersuasive Mackie’s argument should be, replace ‘(objec-
tive) values’ throughout by e.g., ‘transfinite ordinals’.99 They too
would be ‘utterly different from’ anything in Mackie’s universe;
but that does not show that there are no transfinite ordinals.
Thus too, since values are not entities, the account of value being
developed is not a realist one (in the ordinary sense).” 100
Some time spent with that passage will show it to be a rather busy one, with
much going on.
But just because there is ineffective criticism out there of nonsubjective
values, that is no reason to defend subjectivism.
“Values, of one sort or another, are features objects may have or
lack; they are not subjective, they are not features which reduce
to states or conditions of subjects or valuers.”101
So, thus far, the theory to be developed is not realist (in Richard’s technical
sense of that term, i.e., values are not particulars which exist at some time),
nor subjectivist. Nor, it turns out, is it to be an ‘objectivist’ one.
“But no more are they objective features...features entirely de-
tached from valuers.”102
The fact is that
“A largely unquestioned false dichotomy between subjective and
objective ethical theories has served to rule out important op-
tions.”103
That’s the initial layout of the ontological terrain: so far, expressed mostly
in the negative.104 Values are neither this, nor that. And the usual available
99Transfinite ordinals would, presumably, be particulars which were not entities.
100Op cit., p. 154. However, Mannison was not charging the Routleys with realism in the
sense given here, but rather with a form of (what the Routleys would, I believe, recognize
as) objectivism, “i.e., a theory of values that accounts for the truth of ‘x has value’ with no
ineliminable reference to the interests and concerns of the evaluating group” (Mannison,
ENP, 57).
101Ibid.
102Ibid.
103Ibid. (Compare: “The dichotomy between objective and subjective, commonly used
as a weapon against environmental value theories, is . . . a false dichotomy.” Meinong’s
Jungle, p. 680.)
104Except for the statement that “Values. . . are features objects may have or lack”.
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distinctions are not all that ought to be available. (But, as we shall soon see,
a more fine-grained map is being readied.)
Meanwhile, about objectivism in respect of values, well,
“In simplest terms, an objective account of value has values
‘located’ in objects entirely independently of valuers, in the way
that (inertial) mass is located in physical objects independently
of observers; ...objects have values and masses irrespective of
valuers or observers.”105
But objectivism in value theory is beset with problems, both epistemological
and non-epistemological, according to the Routleys. For example,
“Objectivism forces intuitionism, when it is inquired how values
are apprehended or known; thus a fuller objective theory is
always accompanied by an account, so far always unsatisfactory,
characteristically modelled on sense perception, of the way in
which values are intuited or apprehended.106 It is also regularly
assumed on objective accounts that values exist, in the world.”107
On the other hand,
“...a subjective account finds values in, or not independent of,
actual subjects, and commonly as linked with the psychological
states of valuers. ... [S]ubjectivism...always require[s] that where
an item is valued108 there exists, at sometime or other109, a valuer
who values it: ‘no values without a valuer’ holds, in a strong, an
excessively strong, implausible and erroneous, form; namely, a
world without existing valuers in it is, by that very fact, a world
without values.”110
105R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 154.
106Or, as they later put it, according to objectivism,
“. . . values are a. . . set of mysterious independent items somehow perceived by
valuers through a special (even mystical and non-rational) moral sense.” Ibid.,
pp. 162-3.
107Ibid., 154-5. So, it looks as if – according to this taxonomy of sins – some objectivisms
are realisms (and vice versa, of course), but not all. According to an objectivism that was
not realistic, objects would have values irrespective of valuers, but the values, not being
entities, would not exist.
108I think “valued” is to be understood as “valuable”, otherwise the claim borders on the
vacuous.
109Note that Elliot’s ‘less restricted’ subjectivist proposal satisfies this requirement.
110R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 155.
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Summing, a subjective account finds that,
(S2): A world without valuers in it is, by that very fact, a world
without values.111
Equivalently,
S2*: Things in [a] world really are of value, only if they are
valued by some evaluator in that world.
But, clearly, the proposition thought to be supported by last man-type
examples is that (S2) is incorrect.112 Instead, the correct position is:
(N)113 “Although values in a world (more precisely, that items
in that world a have evaluative features) always depend upon
a valuer existing in some world, the valuer may not114 exist in
the world of the values (i.e. the valuer may not exist in a). For
example, our claim that a certain world without valuers, e.g.
a pure plant world of botanically rich form115, is a fine world,
111The difference between S1 and S2 is that S2 features only the necessary condition (of
the necessary and sufficient condition found in S1), and explicitly restricts the location of
the valuer to the world in which the value is located. Preserving much of the linguistic form
of S1 but retaining the logical form and the content of S2, we would have S2*: Things in
[a] world really are of value, only if they are valued by some evaluator in that world.
112For the last man in another possible world (hopefully, Routley’s story is not true of
this world! – remember, the last man is a story) apparently does not intrinsically value the
biosphere. Perhaps none of his fellows ever really did either. And, of course, it no longer
has any instrumental value. But what he does is – all the same – wrong.
113“(N)” is my name for this passage – standing for its “nonjectivism” with respect to
intrinsic value.
114That is, “need not”.
115This is a world the Routleys had alluded to earlier, when writing, for instance, that:
“the example requires variation, e.g. to a wilderness devoid of sentient individuals, if it is
to counter clearly such extensions of Western ethics as those of animal liberationists.” (p.
125)
Cp. “those utilitarians who extend consideration just to sentient creatures are obliged
to reject versions of the last man argument where no sentient creatures are affected”. ( p.
128)
Cp. “Against positions which do not extend the class of objects of moral concern
and candidates for value to include all objects, variants of the counterexamples to the
Western super-ethic can be directed. Consider, for instance, the positions (of usual animal
liberationists) which extend the moral boundaries just to include sentient creatures (or
e.g. preference-havers). Adapt the Last Man and Last People examples, the Wilderness
example, etc., by removing all (inessential) animals from the examples, e.g. the wilderness
contains no animals, in the Last People situation there are no other animals than the
last people themselves. Then the counterexamples apply as before against the liberation
positions.” (pp. 140-1)
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depends on our existing in this world (in order to make the claim,
in fact); but it does not demand in order to ‘make sense’ (of course
the claim is significant) or to be true116, what is ex hypothesis
ruled out, the existence of valuers in the pure plant world. That
the world is a fine one, is dependent on a valuer in some117
world (and that valuer’s assessments of value and ... theory or
overview of what is valuable and not); by contrast, that the world
contains only plants of this or that leaf type, biomass or colour,
does not depend upon a perceiver. Since values are not entirely
independent of a valuer in the way that empirical properties are
independent of an observer, the resulting account is not objective.
An important corollary is that transworld evaluation does not
require objectivism, nor (as we shall see) intuitionism. Call the
resulting account, which is neither objective nor, as is evident,
subjective, nonjective (short for, neither objective nor subjective:
the term is ugly but memorable).”118
Actually, there need be no last man case alluded to here (for the world at
116According to the Routleys (1980), some value judgements are true, though not
absolutely so.
“Ethical judgements, both axiological and deontic, have truth values, relative to
their context of occurrence. By use of context, objections, e.g. from relativity,
to the attribution of truth-values to such judgements can be straightforwardly
avoided.” [R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 164, fn. 78.]
That axiological judgements have truth values means that there are axiological facts,
special value facts. They are special for several reasons. First of all they are relativised to
some kind of context; and secondly, the traditional fact/value “division” (however that
may have to be characterised) obtains. What was accepted by the Routleys in 1980, is
maintained by Richard in 1986; thus:
“According to the way between [cognitivism and noncognitivism], to nonvism if
you like, value judgements are correctly said to be true or false, known or not,
etc., to conform to a cognitive vocabulary – only, in the semantical assessments,
a systemic relativisation of some sort is always tacitly presupposed, in the end.
Without this sort of relativisation, cognitive assignments do not determinately
apply. Of course absolutist positions assume there is a uniquely determined
background system. But as the blatant situation of competing (environmental)
paradigms helps show, the uniqueness assumption is mistaken. While there
may be some evaluations shared by almost all cultures, perhaps even a small
common core, there is no uniquely determined correct value system. There are
various overlapping systems.” [Richard Sylvan, ‘The Way of Values’, (1986),
pp. 12-13. The underlinings are his.]
117In some world, but not necessarily the actual world.
118R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 155.
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issue need never contain men at all); but there is isolation. In this example,
it need only be the kind of inter-worldly isolation119 figuring in Moore’s
case. And Moore’s kind of case, effectively reproduced here by the Routleys,
shows that subjectivism (in particular, S2) must be given up. ‘True’, say
the Routleys, ‘that a world W1 is a fine one is dependent on there being
a valuer is some world assessing W1’.120 But a world of value need itself
contain no valuers: that is the anti-subjectivist lesson of Moore’s method
of worldly isolation, at least as applied here by the Routleys121, and is as
well the anti-subjectivist lesson of the Routleys’ last man and last people
examples.122
Let’s pause to consider these ‘lessons’. It’s one thing for an existing valuer in
the actual world to positively evaluate some possible but non-actual world
itself forever bereft of valuers, thereby – other requisite conditions being met
– yielding value in that possible world, as per Moore’s case (or, as we might
take Routley’s original case: one thing for an existing valuer in an actual
time-slice to negatively evaluate some possible but non-actual time-slice itself
bereft of valuers, thereby – other requisite conditions being met – yielding
disvalue in that possible time-slice).
But suppose the world as it was billions of years ago had subsequently –
with the passage of those billions of years – developed without evaluators
anywhere within. Could it still have been a valuable world? The Routleys
are determinedly answering this question affirmatively. Yes, an evaluator
is required, but not one in the world being assessed. Yet the world being
assessed, of course, is just another non-actual possible world. Nothing new
here. Move along, folks.123
119“Absolute isolation”, as Moore refers to it in sect. 112 of Principia Ethica.
120That is one reason we can confidently say the Routleys really are not objectivists in
the matter of value. And it is why we can say that Mannison got it wrong (or, to be fair,
mis-anticipated) when he presumed the Routleys to be ‘realists’ (meaning ‘objectivists’)
with respect to value.
121And, as Moore, himself, was an objectivist with respect to value, he would not resist
the anti-subjectivist lesson.
122The fifth lesson. To rehearse, the first three are that a new ethic is required, that it
will not contain the freedom principle, and that it offers (or will offer) “environmental
grounds” for morally assessing action. The fourth is that some things are intrinsically
valuable. The fifth, here, is that subjectivism must be rejected.
123Compare Elliot’s similar, but existentially restricted, discussion in Faking Nature,
Routledge (1997):
“Had the course of evolution gone differently, resulting in no conscious
organisms but some biological complexity, the world would have had intrinsic
value.” (27)
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What about valuers themselves? Do they need to be actual valuers? Or can
some possible but non-actual valuers fill the required role in the Routleys’
generative axiological metaphysics?124 The answer is ‘Yes’: some of them
can. Modally, all that is required with respect to valuers is that there be
a valuer in some possible (it needn’t be the actual) world valuing items in
his or her own world, or valuing items in another possible world, or even!
valuing items in the actual world. That is all. Value depends on possible
valuers, but not actual ones.125 I think this is undoubtedly their (1980)
view. Thus, they write:
“The valuer...need not exist; it is only required...that it exist in
some world.”126
One question someone might wish to pursue is whether this meta-ethical
view is a view clearly forced upon us by the last man or last people examples,
This is because
“The thought that there could be values even if no valuers had existed is,
according to the subjectivist, just the thought that there are possible worlds
which contain no valuers, but which are valued (by me) from the perspective
of the actual world.” (30)
124Or, equivalently, their (meta-ethical) theory of value.
125Note, additionally, and importantly, that to say that value depends on evaluators
(more fully: that value depends upon the evaluations of evaluators), is not to say that it
depends upon nothing else. That value depends upon the evaluations of evaluators
“...guarantees...that where a state of affairs has a value then there is a certain
valuer...who assigns that value to that state”. [R. & V. Routley (1980): 157]
In particular, that value depends upon the evaluations of evaluators, does not give the
result that,
“...any state of affairs, however environmentally appalling, is valuable because
we can find a valuer, e.g. a spokesman for your local development association,
who would account it valuable.” [Ibid.]
The ‘nonjectivist’ theory offered here is, after all, a theory of intrinsic value – not
instrumental value (as, for example, investment value).
Contrast such views with Elliot’s subjectivist account of intrinsic value:
“...the subjectivist view makes the valuer the sole determinant of a thing’s
value.” [Elliot (1978): 19]
126R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 156, their fn. 67. It continues to be Richard’s view as
late as The Greening of Ethics (1994), where he writes:
“Many natural items...are valuable in their own right – irrespective of whether
they are interesting or useful, indeed whether or not any valuers exist.” (142)
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or by Moore’s kind of case.127
After all, each of those examples ultimately involves actual people, us –
evaluating, say, the last man’s actions or the prospect of creating a forever
unseen garbage world as opposed to a forever unseen beautiful one. We
actual evaluators are to be observed in the act of evaluating possibilities. Of
course, a conclusion which is, admittedly, forced upon us – if anything is – is
that a possible world without evaluators can be evaluated, and found to have
value, by actual evaluators. So, if subjectivism is (at least in part) the view
that any world of value must have evaluators in it positively evaluating it (as
per the requirements of S2, or S2*), then subjectivism is false128, and the
last man and the last people and Moore’s own example all show this. Still,
suppose someone – wanting to think of themselves as ‘subjectivists’ in some
robust sense – were to reply that in all of these cases (the last man, the last
people, and Moore’s case),
‘there are actual evaluators – Routley, you, me, & G. E. Moore –
who are being relied upon to perform appropriate evaluative acts
in order that there be positive or negative value resident in a
possible but non-actual world’. [RL]
So, it might well seem that such a person is not forced to give up this kind
of subjectivism, viz.,
(S3) Things in any world really are of value, only if there is
some time at which they are actually valued by some evaluator
at Wa;129
127That it might be “clearly forced” may be doubted at the outset, since meta-ethical
views are not typically forced by the very normative views, the fundamental nature of
whose elements they theorize.
128For, according to S2, in the case of anything of value in any possible world, that thing
is evaluated by some evaluator in that very world.
129What kind of subjectivism is this kind? I think it is a kind entailed by Elliot’s account
of his preferred brand of subjectivism, as expressed in this passage (already cited above):
“A subjectivist account of value...links value with the existence of individuals
capable of valuing. The idea is that value only comes into the world if such
individuals exist and if they place value on certain kinds of things. ... There
is one point that needs stressing. Given the account I have offered of value it
does not follow that if X has value at t1 there is an individual who either values
X or is disposed to value X at t1. All that is required is that at some time
or other there exists an individual who values X. It does not matter whether
that individual predates or postdates X: it does not matter whether or not X
and whatever values X have temporal-parts which overlap. ... The strength
of this kind of subjectivism over and above the more restricted kind is that it
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that is, not forced to give it – viz., (S3) – up by the Routleys’ cases, nor by
Moore’s cases either. For as the Routleys claim in (N) above, the truth of
the proposition that
“...a...world without valuers, e.g. a pure plant world of botanically
rich form, is a fine world...”
itself depends not upon the existence of evaluators in that world (which,
anyway, is ruled out ex hypothesi). Instead, in their words,
“...our claim that a certain world without valuers, e.g. a pure
plant world of botanically rich form, is a fine world, depends on
our existing in this world...”.
And which world does “this world” refer to? It refers to the actual world.
So, it might seem that what we are driven to by the force of the Routleys’,
and Moore’s, examples is that the truth of the proposition that
a world without valuers, e.g., a pure plant world of botanically
rich form, is a fine world
depends not on the existence of evaluators in that world but instead apparently
depends on our existing in the actual world. Accordingly, what the Routleys
might appear to have done is to generalize, possibly illegitimately, on this.
On such a view, it would be as if they had concluded,
‘Here we have one possible world, W1, which is botanically rich
but evaluator poor, and another possible world, W2, containing
evaluators who judge W1 to be a fine world. And this is all that
is required as far as the requirement for evaluation goes’,
without mentioning the identity, as found in the examples, between W2 and
Wa. For what they conclude, or anyhow come to, following their consideration
of the last man and last people examples is:
“That the world is a fine one, is dependent on a valuer in some
world.”130
allows that certain states of affairs have intrinsic value even though valuers are
absent from them. Thus this account of value provides some kind of support
for Routley’s last man argument.” [Elliot, ‘Why Preserve Species?’, in ENP,
pp. 19-20]
130R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 155.
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The generalizing move, if that is what it is131, back from ‘this world’ to
‘some world’ – i.e., just any possible world – might strike one as illegitimate.
Whether or not illegitimacy is suspected, that an evaluation is actual –
which is an implicit feature of all the examples – may well be crucial for
value to come into worlds. That it is crucial is a meta-ethical view held by
Robert Elliot, a philosopher wholly sympathetic to the normative outlook
intentionally sponsored by the woeful behaviour of Richard’s last man.132
Nevertheless, it is not the meta-ethical option taken up by the Routleys. In
spite of the fact that S3 is closely tailored to the last man and last people
examples (as well as Moore’s earlier example), the Routleys preferred a looser
– but compatible – fit.133 The (more general, less restrictive) meta-ethical
lesson to be taken from the examples, as they see things, is that evaluators
need not be members of the world being evaluated.134 It is true that
“There are no values which are entirely independent of a valuer....”
135
But, importantly,
“The valuer...need not exist; it is only required...that it exist in
some world.”136
One consequence of this meta-ethical preference is the significant principle
that some things may be intrinsically valuable even though no one has ever
actually valued them (or, for that matter, ever actually will). This is seen as
a great benefit. For one thing, and bluntly,
“Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on
131There is, of course, no evidence that this is something the Routleys were guilty of.
And no evidence, either, that they thought their preferred theory of value was entailed by
their preferred normative theory.
132We have already seen his support of the meta-ethical S3 as expressed in his 1978
paper ‘Why Preserve Species’, and that support continued through to his 1992 paper in
the Monist, ‘Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness’ (cf. pp. 143-144),
and even further.
133As they suggest,
“A meta-ethic does not have to be precisely tailored to a given ethic: the
same (sort of) metalogic may work satisfactorily for many different logics.”
[R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 166.]
134This, of course, is a principle that S3 satisfies.
135R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 156.
136Ibid., p. 156, their fn. 67.
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what humans know or what they see on television. Human inter-
ests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory
basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable.”137
On the other hand, the view being developed
“...still affords the requisite semantical connections between values
and valuers [which] subjectivists have been at pains to maintain,
still allows for the requisite theory dependence and cultural relativ-
ity of values, and still avoids the extravagances of objectivism.”138
But what about this valuer in some possible world? Are any constraints to
be put upon him/her/it? Well, the valuer cannot be
“... an arbitrarily chosen valuer”139
nor
“...some valuer or other (you choose)”.140
No, indeed. Instead, and crucially!
“...the determination of [the] valuer [is] dependent upon the values
concerned”.141
That is,
“...where a state of affairs has a value then there is a certain
valuer...who assigns that value to that state”.142
And what of items whose value is so assigned? Well,
137Richard Routley (1973), p. 20. As pointed out earlier, this passage was deemed
important enough to be largely preserved in R. & V. Routley (1980): p. 184.
138R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 156.
139Ibid., p. 157.
140Ibid.
141Ibid. The emphasis is the Routleys’ own.
142Ibid. This thought, and the previous one, seem to place sufficiency with the states of
affairs having value, not on the valuer. There is no “if and only if” here. If something is
intrinsically valuable, then it is possible that there is a valuer who appreciates that fact
(i.e., it is possible that the value be recognized and appropriately theorized). But possible
valuers do not similarly guarantee value. Valuables rule, possible valuers follow. Valuables
wear the pants here. And this is one reason, I speculate, why Richard in 1994 was not
having it that value should be thought a response-dependent property, given the equivalence
conditions which tend to dominate the way particular response dependent properties are
analysed in the respective literature. See section IX for elaboration on this theme.
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“They have what value they have partly in virtue of features of
their own.”143
The similarities between the Routleys’ nonjectivist views about intrinsic
value as expressed in this 1980 paper, and what later came to be known as
response-dependency144 theories (or dispositional theories) of value – are, so
far, striking. Nor am I anything like the first to notice them. William Grey
(2000), for example writes:
“I am. . . sympathetic to the suggestion, defended by both Syl-
van and Meinong, that there are systematic parallels between
secondary qualities145 and values.146 An analysis of values that
may provide a way of articulating this conception is the response-
dependent approach. . . .”147
Response-dependency theories148 do not begin to appear in any obvious way,
however, until five years later with the publication in 1985 of McDowell’s
‘Values and secondary qualities’.149 Consider this recent overview of response-
dependent properties:
“Response-dependent properties do not depend for their instanti-
ation on the existence of a single conscious entity in the whole
143Ibid., p. 158.
144The phrase was introduced in 1989 by Mark Johnston, in his "Dispositional Theories
of Value", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63, pp. 139-74.
145The notion famously introduced by Locke, as follows:
“...such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but
powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e.
by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours,
sounds, tastes, &c. these I call secondary qualities.” [Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Bk 2, Ch 8, Sec 10]
Being powers in objects, there is every reason to expect that such powers persist even
when all the referents of “us” in this passage are non-existent, just as intrinsic value –
according to the Routleys – also persists in similar circumstances.
146I am so far unconvinced that Sylvan does defend the idea that there are systematic
parallels between secondary qualities and values. Instead, there are several passages in
which he expresses an antagonism to the idea – as we shall see.
147William Grey, ‘A Critique of Deep Green Theory’ in Beneath the Surface, eds. Eric
Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg, MIT Press (2000), p. 56, fn. 20.
148...if one sets aside the very early work of Roderick Firth on ideal observer theory (1952),
which is meta-ethically absolutist (not relativistic, as in the case of the Routleys’ views)...
And how many other response-dependent theories advertise themselves as ‘relativistic’,
and is this a problem for any comparison between the Routleys’ views of intrinsic value
and response dependent views of the properties they target? I am unsure.
149In Morality and Objectivity, Ted Honderich, ed., London: Routledge (1985), pp. 110-29.
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universe; what they depend upon is the presence of a disposition.
Just as a vase may remain fragile in virtue of having a disposition
to break (in C ) even if it never has been, and never will be,
broken, so too the disposition to produce a R in S in C may be
instantiated even if no token of R ever occurs (past, present or
future), no token of S ever exists (past, present or future), and
no token of C ever obtains (past, present or future).”150
Intrinsic value satisfies – according to the Routleys’ explicit account of that
satisfaction – the particular condition of being a response-dependent property
which requires that such properties “not depend for their instantiation on the
existence of a single conscious entity in the whole universe”. The satisfaction
of this condition steers their account clear of subjectivism.
But neither is the Routleys’ account objectivist. As we have seen,
“Values...are features objects may have or lack; they are not
subjective.... But no more are they objective features...features
entirely detached from valuers.”151
For,
“...values in a world (more precisely, that items in that world a
have evaluative features) always depend upon a valuer existing
in some world... That the world is a fine one, is dependent on
a valuer in some world (and that valuer’s assessments of value
and...theory or overview of what is valuable and not)....”152
As Richard Joyce summarizes the response-dependency style of analysis,
“...although analyzing morality in a response-dependent manner
without doubt makes morality existentially mind-independent, it
with equal certainty renders it conceptually mind-dependent.”153
And being “conceptually mind-dependent” (as intrinsic value is with the
Routleys), the rock of objectivism is also avoided.
150Joyce, Richard, ‘Moral Anti-Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/moral-anti-realism/>.
151R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 154.
152Ibid., p. 155. The crucial role of theory in such assessment is addressed further in
Section VIII in the discussion on “emotional presentation”.
153Joyce, op. cit.
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But the comparison of values, as Richard understood them, to ‘secondary
qualities’ – understood, of course, in a broadly Lockean fashion, ultimately
founders. For one thing, as we have already seen, the Routleys (1980) write:
“That the world is a fine one, is dependent on a valuer in some
world (and that valuer’s assessments of value and...theory or
overview of what is valuable and not); by contrast, that the world
contains only plants of this or that leaf type, biomass or colour,
does not depend upon a perceiver.”154
The inclusion of “colour” here is, perhaps, surprising (even, in Alice’s words,
“curiouser and curiouser”) – especially if one is initially attracted to analogies
of intrinsic-value-as-theorized-by-the-Routleys, with secondary qualities given
a broadly Lockean reading (which, featuring as it does the notion of powers,
would appear not to require existing percipients). Maybe, one thinks, the
inclusion of colour (as ‘not depending upon a perceiver’) was just a moment
of careless writing. Is there more? Well, consider this inconvenient morsel
from Richard (now Sylvan), writing in (1992):
“As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, so there
can be values without valuers.”155
Of course, there is nothing deeply troubling about the comparison between
shapes and values with respect to the possibility of there being both in
the absence of percipients/valuers. For values could still, consistently, and
overall, best be compared with colour, construed as a secondary quality.
Consequently, just as we might consider the first passage careless, so we
might consider this one merely inconvenient. ‘Got anything else?’ -How
about this third passage?
“Values are not apart from the actual world, something ‘projected’
or imposed on it...something colouring...the otherwise valueless
physical world, rather in the way that reductionistic materialism
tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a
colourless physical world.”156
154R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 155.
155‘On the Value Core of Deep-Green Theory’, Richard Sylvan. In Justice, Ethics, and
New Zealand Society, eds. G. Oddie and R. Perrett, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp.
222-223. What’s inconvenient here is the well-known fact that shapes are thought of as
primary qualities by Locke (although Locke uses the term ‘figure’ instead). Cf. Locke’s
Essay at Bk. II, Ch. 8, Sects. 14-15.
156Op. cit., p. 223.
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This is more than just inconvenient, isn’t it? Because, after all, part of the
traditional story about secondary qualities is that
“...the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have
no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas,
existing in the bodies themselves. They are, in the bodies we
denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations
in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain
bulk, figure and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies
themselves, which we call so.”157
As Crispin Wright has remarked about Locke’s view of secondary qualities:
“Locke’s own conception of the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities incorporated an ‘error theory’ of the latter:
the thought that nothing really is as secondary quality experience
represents it as being.”158
The systematic error “incorporated” within Locke’s conception of secondary
qualities is something Richard would not welcome in any interpretation of his
view (of intrinsic value) as itself importantly akin to a ‘secondary quality’.159
157Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk 2, Ch 8, Sect 15.
158Crispin Wright, ‘Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities’, Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vols. Vol. 62 (1988), p. 1.
159Careful readers will have noticed, too, that there is in the passage from Sylvan which
we have most recently inspected, a negative mention of ‘projection’. Given that projectivism
(often associated with secondary qualities) incorporates its own corollary of systematic
error, Richard is not having anything resembling projectivism when it comes to (something
as important as) intrinsic value. He would surely have parted company with Hume when
the latter wrote:
“Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily
ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: The
latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The
one discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or
diminution: The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all
natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in
a manner, a new creation.” [Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals, Appendix 1, Para 21/21.]
Richard came to regard projectivism as an expression of a “powerful force” in the
Anglo-American tradition which has had the effect of ‘thoroughly subverting value theory’
(1986, p. 2), the powerful force being the
“...epistemologization of value, which conflates how values come to be known,
or acquired, with what is known, what values are, what standing they have,
and what meaning. This confusion of epistemology with sistology, which is
spectacularly exhibited in verification principles and the like (to the effect
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Nor, as the previous passage and many others indicate, is Richard generally
very happy with reductionism in philosophical enterprise, and as we shall
very shortly see, Richard is of the view that colour lends itself to such.
And then there is this:
“The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful
than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour,
or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow.”160
For one thing
“...shape discrimination is more culture dependent....”161
And shape
“...is, or was, a primary property, and thereby more immune to re-
ductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour.”162
that meaning and standing amount to matters of verification and ways of
coming to know), lies behind the erroneous picture of values as matters of
feeling or interests or expression of emotion and as (only) projected into the
world through human valuings.” [‘The Way of Values’ in Three essayes upon
deeper environmental ethics (1986), p. 2.]
And with the thorough subversion of value theory comes the impoverishment of the
world.
“...even more than with specific-sense qualities of bodies – the so-called
secondary qualities – such as those of colour, smell, taste, touch and the
like, there has been with emotional and valuational qualities – sometimes
now called tertiary qualities – a concerted attempt to reduce the qualities
experienced to features of the experiencers. Indeed so successful has this
been in Western cultures, that many there take it for granted that valuation
features are not really features of independent things in the world, but are
products of those experiencing the things, ‘projected back’ by the experiencers
onto things. Beauty and the like are in us, not in places; in the eyes of the
beholders. So the developers who destroy the places and therewith destroy
their beauty, only touch us who experience the beauty, not anything about
the places. Perhaps we should be compensated, not the places, for there was
nothing there ... (‘We rationalise that the place we inhabit has no normative
structures and that we can do as we please’: Rolston, p. 150).” [‘The Way
of Values’ in Three essayes upon deeper environmental ethics (1986), p. 10.
The underlinings are in the original.]
160‘On the Value Core of Deep-Green Theory’, Richard Sylvan. In Justice, Ethics, and
New Zealand Society, eds. G. Oddie and R. Perrett, Oxford University Press, 1992, p.
223.
161Ibid., p. 224.
162Ibid.
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Well, even though the evidence is abundant that Richard was not happy
likening value with Lockean-like secondary qualities, perhaps his views about
value can, more generally, be brought under the umbrella of response depen-
dent properties – as Grey suggests. Alas, at least according to Sylvan’s views
about his views, there is no promise here at all. Writing with David Bennett
in 1994, he says
“Goodness, and value more generally...are not secondary or ter-
tiary or response-dependent properties, and a comparison with
shape is superior to one with colour.”163
Someone, or some several, must have broken the news to Richard that his
axiology was being interpreted in the fashion just revealed. And, yes, this
is a definitive rejection by him of that budding interpretative effort. So,
it seems to me that a line now needs to be drawn under this particular,
somewhat popular, attempt to elaborate Richards’ theory of value (at the
very least, as Richard himself saw it). In spite of detectable and apparently
significant similarities between Richard’s developing axiological theory on
the one hand, and response-dependency theories on the other, it appears one
must look elsewhere (presumably, and carefully, to Richard’s own further
works and words) in order to fairly characterize, and thus understand, his
axiological views for what they were. For all of his negative views – values
are not subjective, not objective, not (much like) secondary qualities, not
response-dependent properties – are surely to be understood in the light of
his positive views about value, and our access to it. I will return, briefly, to
these matters later – in the final section, Section IX.
163Richard Sylvan & David Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, The White Horse Press,
Cambridge, UK (1994), p. 143. Although, in this late passage, he writes that value is not a
response-dependent property, he was (at least earlier) willing to countenance one significant
similarity (putting “dispositionals” in the place of “response-dependent properties”):
“If a syntactical comparison [for “value predicates”] is wanted, that with
dispositionals is better [than that with indexicals], that with secondary quality
terms in particular. Where object a is v then, for both values and colours, a is
such as to feel or seem v to any normal participant in given framework s – a
first-approximation connection which turns in part on the meaning of ‘normal’.”
[‘The Way of Values’ (1986), p. 15]
This is, however, entirely consistent with his rejection of the proposition that value
predicates are response-dependent predicates. For the likeness he points to here is only one
half of the equivalence condition deployed in the typical analysis of response-dependent
predicates (such as ‘red’). See section IX of this paper.
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VII. What Sort of Items Have Intrinsic Value?
Well, it is time to take (temporary) leave from this issue, and return to the
issue of good reasons, i.e., to “the issues of what sort of items have or carry
noninstrumental value, and how they obtain it”, issues which, you will recall,
“cannot be escaped indefinitely”. The question, more exactly, is how is the
“assignment of (intrinsic) value to some items independent of the states and
conditions of humans” either “possible, or rational?”.164
Recall, too, that the Routleys had suggested that
“Evaluative features such as worth, merit, beauty are features
which...do not have a hard observational basis but are decidedly
theory-dependent.”165
and that, as a consequence of this, it had begun to look as if good reasons
that might be offered for X’s being of intrinsic value would have to take
the form of being good reasons offered for an entire theory (presumably,
of value) within which X is assigned ‘intrinsically valuable’ status. But, in
fact, this makes it seem more plausible that good reasons for X’s being of
intrinsic value can be offered, just because the task has been transformed
into the offering of good reasons for an entire theory of value (within which
X has a place as something of intrinsic value). Remember that the reason
it seemed so difficult to offer reasons for X being of intrinsic value, without
that supportive context, was that the usual reason-giving pattern, viz., the
kind associated with saying why something has instrumental value, was
unavailable. But, now, our options have been increased. We can talk about
the explanatory power of an entire theory of value within which...[etc.].
As regards ‘good reasons for an entire theory of value within which X has a
place as something of intrinsic value’, the strategy of the Routleys (1980)
– at least in the very first instance – is to go on the attack, specifically, to
assimilate enemy ethics, i.e., human chauvinist ethics, to ethical egoism,
except that in this case the ‘egoism’ is of the group-variety. Paraphrasing,
‘Since humans, persons, indeed, agents generally – taken collec-
tively – can never, well, not really, do anything except that which
is in their perceived collective ‘interest’ (i.e., their perceived col-
lective advantage), it follows that they, again taken collectively,
164R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 152. The question was one of the last raised at
the end of Section V.
165Ibid., p. 153.
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are not obliged to do anything else than act in their collective
or group, or species-‘interest’ as they see it (i.e., not obliged
to do anything else than act to secure their perceived collective
advantage).’
And this bit of negative deontic ‘wisdom’ must be reflected in an axiological
theory. All good is that – can only be that – which is to the advantage, or the
perceived advantage, of the agent, in this case the group agent, i.e., humanity
(or persons, or possibly, preference-having creatures in good working order).
Hence, all good is that which is to the advantage of the limited Moral Club,
as perceived by its members.
But just because the genuine problems of ethical egoism (and psychological
egoism) have been so well exposed – to the extent that it is fair to say
that the standard arguments against such egoisms, many well-known since
at least Butler’s writings, and improved upon since, are generally thought
to be among the most powerful and successful arguments in the history
of philosophy – just for that reason, it is surprising that chauvinist ethics,
especially human chauvinist ethics, should still (1980) be so vigorous. For
such arguments as might be offered in favour of chauvinist ethics are no
more than transforms of the arguments for ethical egoism; and thus all the
arguments against (human) individualistic varieties of ethical egoism apply
equally well against collective varieties.
A passage which efficiently demonstrates the existence and the spirit of this
strategy, a strategy pursued by the Routleys in lengthy and laboured fashion,
is this one from ‘Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism’ (1979):
“Most philosophers think they know how to discredit the egoist
arguments. It is curious indeed then, that an argument which
is regarded as so unsatisfactory in the individual case – that
for egoism – remains unchallenged and is still considered so
convincing in a precisely parallel group case – that for human
chauvinism.”166
Well, perhaps this is all so, that is, perhaps all the arguments against
(human) individualistic varieties of ethical egoism apply equally well against
collective varieties. If it is so, then the way is open for some version of
166R. & V. Routley, ‘Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism’, in Ethics and
Problems of the 21st Century, ed. by K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979: 47.
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non human-chauvinist ethic. Some version, yes, but they are legion.167
And amongst many of the non human-chauvinist ethics, some of them are
still inappropriately chauvinist, e.g., sentient-chauvinist ethics, others which
inappropriately deploy the notion of rights, and so on.
The question then is forced: which amongst the non-chauvinist ethical
theories is the best, and why?
The Routleys are not shy about putting forward their own favoured kind of
candidate amongst the possible kinds of non human-chauvinist ethic. It is a
“multiple factor model” (170) in which certain very general properties such as
“...diversity of systems and creatures, naturalness, integrity of
systems, stability of systems [and] harmony of systems”168
each contribute, ceteris paribus, to the intrinsic value of the entities possessing
them. A ceteris paribus clause is required because the factors can, and not
untypically do, compete with one another (e.g. diversity v. naturalness). So
in an account of the intrinsic value of something, it will be the case in most
situations that the maximization of each factor, considered on its own, will
be constrained by the others. I am putting things in this somewhat awkward
way in order to retain the thing (the forest, the river, or the local ecosystem)
as the bearer of intrinsic value (the ‘entity’, as Richard would put it). For
I think this is usually the way the Routleys (1980) think of these matters.
But not always.
Here is one of their accounts of how – in particular situations – this multiple
factor model works, and in the account you can witness the bearer of value
become the property of diversity itself (as opposed to the thing bearing that
property).
“Optimizing a mix of factors, which are mutually constrained,
meets constant reproaches made against such ecological values
as diversity. The objections take the form that enhancement
of diversity as a sole factor can lead to undesirable ecological
results, indeed can diminish net value.... On the multiple factor
model diversity is constrained by naturalness and stability, for
example; thus net value is not going to be increased through
increasing the diversity of a simple temperate rainforest by felling
167“There are...various competing environmental ethics, some simple extensions of Western
ethics which extrapolate the notion of right, some not, some rationalistic, some not, and
so on.” [R. & V. Routley (1980): 175.]
168Ibid.: p. 170. The view is reminiscent of Leopold’s.
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some of its trees and replacing them with exotic species. On
the other hand, diversity will be increased by planting the banks
of a stream, eroded through excess clearing and overgrazing,
with suitable exotic species – then birds and other animals will
increase as well as plant diversity – and in such a case stability
will also be increased in the longer term and naturalness not
diminished (since already removed); thus overall value will be
increased.... Diversity, though (like enjoyment or pleasure) good in
itself, is (again like hedonistic values) not an unconstrained value
(compare, e.g., enjoyment obtained through secret maltreatment
of animals....).”169
Personally, I think this is a moment of confusion, easily repaired. Strictly
speaking, it is the thing, the ‘entity’ (the “simple temperate rainforest”)
which is (or ought to be regarded as) the bearer of intrinsic value. It is the
simple temperate forest which is good in itself. Not diversity, not naturalness,
and so forth. These properties, possessed by the actual bearer of intrinsic
value, are what contribute to the thing’s being intrinsically valuable (i.e.,
being of intrinsic value). The relevant properties are mutually constrained
value-makers. And, generally, apart from some slip-ups, this is the way the
Routleys develop their account. It is, however, easy to slip into the other
way of talking – as a convenient shorthand.
Janna Thompson’s criticism170 of the adequacy of such a ‘multiple factor’
modelling of what preservationists really value is perhaps initially troubling,
but ultimately ineffective. It goes as follows:
“In the late Cretaceous, seventy million years ago, the earth was
devastated by one of the worst cataclysms in the history of the
planet. No large land animal was left in existence; an enormous
number of species of plants and animals were destroyed in the sea
as well as on land. The forms of life remaining were enormously
depleted in numbers, and they were left on an earth that would
have seemed empty.
Let us suppose that this destruction was caused by intelligent
beings from another planet who used Earth as a testing ground
169R. & V. Routley, (1980), pp. 170-171. The italics are mine.
170In ‘Preservation of Wilderness and the Good Life’, Janna L. Thompson in Environ-
mental Philosophy, eds., Robert Elliot and Arran Gare, Univ. of Queensland Pr., 1983,
pp. 85-105. The two quoted paragraphs are at pp. 90-91.
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for neutron bombs. Were their actions wrong?171 The immediate
effect was, of course, severe degradation of ecosystems. But
after several million years, new systems of plants and animals
established themselves. It would be hard to argue that in the
very long term, the postcatastrophe environments were any less
valuable than the precatastrophe environments.172 For similar
reasons we might argue that the last people would not be wrong to
destroy large parts of their planet, providing they did not destroy
everything.173 But what preservationists want to condemn is our
lack of concern for the environmental systems and species that
now exist on earth. They would not condemn human actions less
if they believed that after a million years or so, the earth could
recover from human devastation. What the preservationist really
wants is for us to come to value a more respectful, harmonious
way of living with nature. But this result by no means follows
from an insistence that some properties of natural systems are
intrinsically valuable.”174
The major response to Thompson’s odd, and somewhat puzzling, critique
must, I think, point out the (Routleys’ insistence on the) value-making
character of the natural (and the consequent net disvalue resulting from
interference175 with it) – oddly, the particular factor Thompson most ignores
171Of course they were, or rather – mindful of the fact that this is only a possible world
– of course their actions would have been wrong, for the intelligent beings would have
destroyed much of what was of intrinsic value. And this fact is unaffected by the recovery
that was to come in the world in question.
172That may be so (though, of course, we have no idea what the ‘post-catastrophe
environment’ might have been like had there been no catastrophe in the first place).
Nevertheless, this fact (let us admit it as such) does not seem to diminish the wrongness
of the actions of the hypothetical intelligent beings.
173But these reasons do not seem to be good reasons at all! Is it really to be morally
permissible to deliberately destroy things of intrinsic value provided that in the end (e.g., 70
million years on), things – now left to their own reparative ways – will somehow ‘work out’?
This would seem the maddest form of objective consequentialism. And I am not sure that
Thompson thinks they would be good reasons either. Rather, it is as if she is intimating
that a mere “insistence that some properties of natural systems are intrinsically valuable”
(and with only that in his or her argumentative arsenal) may well land a philosopher – who
so insists – in such an unsatisfactory moral region.
174What, not even if one of those properties were itself the property of being natural, i.e.,
of being naturally evolved? Why wouldn’t we ‘want to come to value a more respectful,
harmonious way of living with nature’ if we thought of ‘being natural’ as contributing to
the intrinsic value of something?
175Unless, of course, the ‘interference’ is of the in-built constraining variety deriving from
other intrinsic value-making properties.
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in her criticism, and not present at all in her own example. Instead, what is
present in her example is the interference with natural process by actions of
“intelligent beings”.
Environmentalists may stress the value of natural process, even when such
processes are inevitably destructive, however temporarily, of some of the
other value-making-factors (e.g., stability of systems). Then again, depending
on the situation, they may not. The important, and difficult, kind of debate
prefigured here (about when to stress the value of natural process over other
factors of value, and when not) is highly reminiscent of the heated debate
in America over what to do about the enormous, naturally caused (at least
immediately so), Yellowstone fires of 1989 - and what ought to have been
done, before, during, and after that cataclysmic event.
This sort of issue is briefly touched on, in the broad, by Val Plumwood, in
her discussion of another, later, article of Thompson’s, viz., ‘A Refutation of
Environmental Ethics’.176
“[Thompson] ask[s]: ‘How can [such an ethic] justify not being
concerned to prevent (if possible) natural occurrences which
threaten the stability, diversity, and integrity of an environmental
system?’ It in no way follows that it is not [so concerned].
When the criteria are in conflict, it certainly does not follow that
naturalness overrides all other values or criteria in such a case.”177
The multiple factor model can be put to further use as well, a use which
works to integrate the new ethic with the older traditional ethic. Here is how
the Routleys put this point:
“The multiple factor model also solves the problem of how to
combine traditional values...with...environmental values...by a
constrained optimisation which takes due (i.e. weighted) account
of them all. Thus in moving to an environmental (or nonchau-
vinist) ethic one is not denying ordinarily acknowledged welfare
values for persons or humans, but simply recognising a further
set of values to which such welfare values should be added. Nor is
one devaluing humans, for human welfare values are retained; one
is simply aiming to remove – through constraints which may re-
176Janna Thompson, ‘A Refutation of Environmental Ethics’, Environmental Ethics 12
(1990): 147-60.
177Val Plumwood, ‘Ethics and Instrumentalism: A Response to Janna Thompson’,
Environmental Ethics 13 (1991), pp. 139-149. This passage on p. 144.
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duce assignments to human values in favour of other values – the
unwarranted privilege and chauvinism of the displaced Western
super-ethic.
One would not have come very far if, despite the claim to have
recognised environmental values, one assumed that wherever
there is conflict between natural values and human values, the
latter must always prevail. This would be equivalent to assigning
them very low weight, or even zero value,178 in all serious conflict
cases. ... To allow that some reduction in human welfare values
may sometimes – or even often, especially with increasing human
populations – have to be accepted in cases of conflict is an essential
part of assigning a genuine positive value to nonhuman factors.
Sometimes humans, their states and conditions, do not come
first.”179
Yet to seek a quick answer to our original, and motivating, question (in
case you have forgotten, it was: “which amongst the non-chauvinist ethical
theories is the best, and why?”) may well be to want what many beginners
in philosophy want, the truth now. However, an adequate ethic is, it seems,
properly the object of on-going cultural (and these days intercultural) propos-
als along with proposed justifications of them, critiques of such substantive
and justificatory proposals, responses to these critiques, counter-proposals,
internal and friendly critiques of justifications for proposals leading to friendly
but possibly significant modifications of proposals, a smattering of traded
relevance and consequent optimism among parties to the on-going discussion,
a barrel of irrelevance and correlative frustration; and perhaps all of this with
no more end in sight than physical science itself has. It is, after all, a human
project, and there is as much disagreement about proper methodology, or
even its possibility, as there is about content. Still, it is theory-construction,
normative theory construction, which is being attempted in all this, and it is
near to impossible to avoid being caught up in it to some extent. And, in
spite of profound methodological disagreements, and even disagreement over
whether there could be adequate methodology in such a domain of (optimisti-
cally) ‘inquiry’ or (less optimistically) ‘endeavour’, there is no knock-down
argument to the effect that there is just no prospect of ‘success’ – only some
disagreement about what might constitute success. Hence, as far as the pro-
178Importantly, assignment appears inescapable. If high positive intrinsic value assignment
requires justification, so, too, will low or even zero intrinsic value assignment.
179R. & V. Routley, op. cit., p. 171.
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vision of, and persuasion to, adequate (thus, new) normative environmental
theory goes, I suppose it is early days, and that the Routleys conceded, or
even would have insisted, on that. And as is often the case, theory provision
– and persuasion, self or otherwise, to theory thereby provided – will follow
practice.
Such practice is complex and labor-intensive:
“In the case of transformation to environmental values, what
is often important are distinctive features regarding the factual
bases of many of the evaluations. In particular, there is the matter
of removing or correcting widespread misconceptions on a broad
range of matters of environmental concern; for example, about
animals, their various behaviours, abilities, etc; about the alleged
gulf between humans and other animals and the uniqueness of
humans and each human; about the profitability, or desirability,
or necessity, of environmentally destructive enterprises; about the
inevitability of current Western social arrangements and about
the history of the way these particular arrangements developed.
There is, moreover, the matter of sheer information, for example
as to how free animals live together and what they do; about how
factory and experimental animals are treated, and in the latter
case for what: about the sources and effects of various forms
of pollution and the reasons for it; about how natural creatures
such as whales or environments such as forests are commonly
dealt with, for what products, by what interests, for what ends.
Naturally (given a fact/value division), none of this information
is entirely conclusive support for a change in ethic; for many of
the evaluations the data help support can be included in other
ethics (including sometimes modifications of prevailing ethics),
while remaining evaluations can, at worst, be simply rejected (as
e.g., those utilitarians who extend consideration just to sentient
creatures are obliged to reject versions of the last man argument
where no sentient creatures are affected).”180
180Ibid., pp. 127-128.
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VIII. Emotional Presentation, Systemic Relativisation, the Phe-
nomenological Base, Theory
(A) Emotional Presentation. When it comes to the matter of our rela-
tionships to things of intrinsic value, there is – as we have just been examining
– this complex and labor-intensive matter of defending an (entirely natural-
istic) “theory of intrinsic value which assigns intrinsic value to wilderness
and species of free animals” (139). But “the matter of sheer information”
that will play a role in this defense will not be “entirely conclusive for a
change in ethic” for a variety of reasons. One reason, say the Routleys, is
the “fact/value division”. Additionally, as we have just seen,
“...many of the evaluations the data helps support can be included
in other ethics (including sometimes modifications of prevailing
ethics), while remaining evaluations can, at worst, be simply
rejected.”181
But defending a particular normative theory of intrinsic value, in the natural
course of events, ‘comes later ’ – if I may so put it. And, so, this is true
of defending a “theory of intrinsic value which assigns intrinsic value to
wilderness and species of free animals”. Typically, defending a theory of
intrinsic value (within which intrinsic value – just to take an example – is
assigned to “wilderness and species of free animals”) follows an original
assignment. And the source of that assignment, too, has a place in ‘the
matter of our relationships to things of intrinsic value’ just as much as does
the complex and labor-intensive matter of defending a particular normative
theory of intrinsic value. Richard’s discussion of that source goes under the
heading of “emotional presentation”.
The matter is first introduced in ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental
Ethics’ (1980), thus by both Richard and Val, in brief discussion as to
different ways in which a place may emotionally present – and we have
previously noted the introductory passage:
“There is an enormous felt or emotive difference between feel-
ing that a place should be valued or respected for itself, for its
perceived beauty and character, and [on the other hand] feeling
that it should not be defaced because it is valued by one’s fel-
low humans, and provides pleasurable sensations or money or
convenience for them. ... These differences in emotional presen-
tation are accompanied by or expressed by an enormous range
181Ibid., p. 128.
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of behavioural differences.... The sort of behaviour warranted by
each viewpoint and thought admissible by it, the concept of what
one is free to do, for example, will normally be very different. It
is certainly no coincidence that cultures holding to the intrinsic
view have normally been far less destructive of nature than the
dominant Western human chauvinist culture.”182
Three years later emotional presentation receives its next mention from the
Routleys in ‘Semantical Foundations for Value Theory’,183 a paper appearing
in the September, 1983 issue of Noûs. The mention is brief, but instructive
– the first passage being this:
“...the valued object may be emotionally presented and its value
thus recognised, without its value simply amounting to its emo-
tional presentation.”184
Explicit here is the anti-reductionist thesis in the Routleys’ writing: although
emotional presentation occupies a crucial role in any adequate axiology185,
value does not reduce to emotional presentation. Secondly, although it is not
entirely clear from this passage (because it is not clear what work is being
indicated by the occurrence of “thus”), it will in time become clear that they
think the emotional presentation of an object is crucial to recognition of its
value.186
“In the end environmental value systems are based on differ-
ent preference rankings from the chauvinistic systems they now
compete with, a different group preference ranking (for those
of the new deeper environmental movement) which may be the
result of a different perception (and emotional presentation) of
the world.”187
The very large topic of emotional presentation and the nature of its role in
our relationship to things of intrinsic value is – so far as I am aware – not
addressed by Richard (now Sylvan) in any kind of extended way until his
182Ibid., p. 131.
183‘Semantical Foundations for Value Theory’, R. & V. Routley, Noûs 17 (3), Sep. 1983,
pp. 441-456.
184Ibid., p. 453.
185That is, any meta-theory of value, including an account of our access to it.
186The thesis is reminiscent of Hume’s account of the role of desire in action. No action
without desire. No recognition of value without emotional presentation (within which
desire often has a crucial role).
187Ibid., p. 454.
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1986 essay entitled, ‘The Way of Values: elaborating Meinong’s theory of
impersonal values’.188 This, he says, takes the form of “free variation on
Meinong’s theory”:
“Since what is sought is a theory of values which blends both with
object-theory and with deeper environmental theory, and which
makes proper room for cultural and paradigmatic differences, free
variation on Meinong’s theory will be the approach. However,
the input from Meinong’s theory will be evident, and crucial
at points, especially in the treatment of values as non-Platonic
objects and in the account of access to their instantiation through
emotional presentation.”189
It appears from this early claim (about “access”) that Sylvan credits emotional
presentation with a role in some epistemic (or epistemic-like) process.
Meinong, like Sylvan, is no subjectivist. According to the latter, Meinong
introduces a
“...theory of impersonal value, of value without valuers, and the
removal of ‘false psychologism’ from value theory (On Emotional
Presentation, p. 125ff.).”190
That emotion and evaluation and value are somehow connected has long been
recognized – but, according to Sylvan, utterly misconceived – in received
philosophical traditions. For example, there is the tradition of projectivism
arising, he says, out of a very powerful but subverting force, viz., what he
called “the epistemologization of value” (2):
“...which conflates how values come to be known, or acquired,
with what is known, what values are, what standing they have,
and what meaning. This confusion of epistemology with sistology
(the study of objects and their standing), which is spectacularly
exhibited in verification principles and the like (to the effect that
meaning and standing amount to matters of verification and ways
of coming to know), lies behind the erroneous picture of values
188This article (‘The Way of Values’: elaborating Meinong’s theory of impersonal values’) is
the first of three articles by Richard to be found in: Three essayes upon deeper environmental
ethics, by Richard Sylvan. It is Number 13 in the Preprint series in Environmental
Philosophy, Departments of Philosophy, Australian National University (1986), ISSN 0729
– 2708.
189Ibid., p. 1.
190Ibid.
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as matters of feeling or interests or expression of emotion and as
(only) projected into the world through human valuings.”191
Routley, that is, Sylvan, is having none of this impoverishment of the world.
“...even more than with specific-sense qualities of bodies – the
so-called secondary qualities – such as those of colour, smell,
taste, touch and the like, there has been with emotional and
valuational qualities – sometimes now called tertiary qualities
– a concerted attempt to reduce the qualities experienced to
features of the experiencers. Indeed so successful has this been
in Western cultures, that many there take it for granted that
valuation features are not really features of independent things
in the world, but are products of those experiencing the things,
‘projected back’ by the experiencers onto things. Beauty and the
like are in us, not in places; in the eyes of the beholders. So the
developers who destroy the places and therewith destroy their
beauty, only touch us who experience the beauty, not anything
about the places. Perhaps we should be compensated, not the
places, for there was nothing there ... (‘We rationalise that the
place we inhabit has no normative structures and that we can do
as we please’: Rolston, p. 150).”192
The relationship between emotional presentation and value when properly
understood is understood quite differently. Although there are emotional
presentations, what they are, are
“...emotional bases through which values come to be known.”193
So far, this follows Meinong’s intentions which, as described by J. N. Findlay
in his Foreword to the English translation of Über emotionale Präsentation,
were to present a
“...theory of the possibility of there being values at once given in
and through emotion and yet also ontologically independent of
emotion or of any subjective attitude.”194
But,
191Ibid., p. 2.
192Ibid., p. 10. The underlinings are Richard’s. The Rolston quotation is from H. Rolston,
‘Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?’, Environmental Ethics 4 (1982), pp. 125-51.
193Ibid., p. 3.
194Findlay’s foreword to On Emotional Presentation, by Alexius Meinong, tr. M-L
Schubert Kalsi, North-western University Press, 1972, p. xi.
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“...Meinong’s early argument for the factuality of values is impor-
tantly modified in [one] respect: [it is] relativised.”195
(B) Systemic Relativisation. As we have already seen196, back in 1980,
the Routleys had written that:
“...the distribution of values (and especially of intrinsic values)
is much more theory (system, or viewpoint) relative than the
distribution of charges.”197
And, as well, that,
“Ethical judgements, both axiological and deontic, have truth
values, relative to their context of occurrence.”198
The later (1986) approving reference to “the factuality of values” (5) suggests
that just as axiological judgments have truth values (as per 1980, p. 164, fn.
78), so there are also facts of the matter when it comes to what’s valuable:
that is, there are value facts. But such value facts are so, that is, are facts,
relative to some ‘framework’, or ‘context’. That axiological judgements have
truth values suggests that Sylvan’s theory of value judgements is cognitive,
but – on the other hand – that their truth is relativised might seem to cloud
the distinction (cognitive/non-cognitive). No worries; Sylvan will regard his
meta-ethic as neither cognitivist nor noncognitivist. It will be fairly regarded
as ‘nonvistic’.
“According to the way between [cognitivism and noncognitivism],
to nonvism if you like, value judgements are correctly said to
be true or false, known or not, etc., to conform to a cognitive
vocabulary – only, in the semantical assessments, a systemic
relativisation of some sort is always tacitly presupposed, in the
end. Without this sort of relativisation, cognitive assignments do
not determinately apply. Of course absolutist positions assume
there is a uniquely determined background system. But as the
blatant situation of competing (environmental) paradigms helps
show, the uniqueness assumption is mistaken. While there may
be some evaluations shared by almost all cultures, perhaps even
195Richard Sylvan, ‘The Way of Values’ in Three essayes upon deeper environmental
ethics, p. 5.
196At the end of Section V.
197R. & V. Routley, ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’, p. 153.
198Ibid., p. 164, fn. 78. See footnote 116 in this paper.
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a small common core, there is no uniquely determined correct
value system. There are various overlapping systems.”199
This combination of having truth values and being the object of knowledge,
on the one hand, with systemic relativisation on the other, can be found
disturbing. For example, William Grey (2000) writes:
“This relativism is less disturbing on a noncognitivist account
of values. . . . However, Sylvan defends a cognitivist account
of value, and the relativity of evaluative judgments for him is
therefore problematic.”200
It seems Grey doesn’t take Richard’s disclaimer seriously, i.e., the disclaimer
that he is not a cognitivist; or else, for some reason, Grey does not think the
“way between”-move is legitimate – that one has a forced choice here: either
be a noncognitivist, or else take your cognitivist lumps. As to the former
– not taking the disclaimer seriously – well, it is not as if the disclaimer is
casually delivered, not some mere passing remark. Consider this:
“The prevailing divisions and classifications of value theory rest
on a series of false dichotomies. The dichotomies are damaging
because, if they were accepted in the way their exponents insist,
they would rule out viable and important positions concerning
values – including, so it is contended, the way values are. . . .
[One] false contrast is the cognitivist/non-cognitivist dichotomy.
‘Are you a cognitivist about values or not?’ is a favoured initial
move in a philosophical game that often ends in quick defeat
for non-standard positions. Well, we environmentalists are spoil-
sports, and are not playing the game. There’s something right,
and something wrong, about each of the answers admitted: cog-
nitivist and non-cognitivist, the usual (vistic) answers. And we
can say exactly what.”201
199‘The Way of Values’, by Richard Sylvan, in Three essayes upon deeper environmental
ethics (1986), pp. 12-13; #13 Preprint series in Environmental Philosophy, Depts of
Philosophy, ANU, ISSN 0729 – 2708. The underlinings are Richard’s.
200William Grey, ‘A Critique of Deep Green Theory’, Beneath the Surface, eds. Eric Katz,
Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg, MIT Press (2000), p. 47.
201Sylvan (1986), op. cit., p. 12. Re “. . . and we can say exactly what”: I speculate that
what he takes to be right, and in that sense what is right about cognitivism is that value
judgments are true or false, but what is wrong with cognitivism is that value judgments
are not true or false absolutely; and what is right about non-cognitivism is that value
judgments are not true or false absolutely, but what is wrong with non-cognitivism is that
value judgments are true or false. (So that what is right about cognitivism is what is
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With a rather determined passage like that confronting one, it seems odd –
did Richard find it maddening? – simply to write: “However, Sylvan defends
a cognitivist account of value”! No, he doesn’t – even though he finds
something right about it (value judgments are true or false); but cognitivism
is (at least in Sylvan’s sights) a complex position. It is the view that value
judgments are true or false, and that they are true or false absolutely. It is not
clear that Grey is prepared to countenance this particular complexity. To be
true or false is to be true or false absolutely. ‘Frame relative truth’ appears
to be a no go domain. Grey (2000) thinks there is something “unstable”
here.202 The terra is not firma.
According to Sylvan, such “systemic relativisation” is not a form of ‘ethical
relativism’ – at least not if that is understood to involve “independent” (non-
overlapping), noncomparable, or “equally satisfactory” systems. Systemic
relativisation is, instead, what is required by “cultural pluralism”. In Sylvan’s
words:
“To say all this is not to succumb to some sort of ethical rela-
tivism.... What is being advanced is rather a cultural pluralism....
Such a pluralism differs from [ethical] relativism in several impor-
tant ways, in particular the following:- The systems (frameworks,
cultures) with respect to which semantical assessment is rela-
tivised are by no means independent, but may overlap, and,
more significantly, admit of assessment and evaluation from one
another. Thus systems are not incomparable, or, different, all
equally satisfactory. Rather some, seen from where we are, are
more satisfactory than others. ...evaluative frameworks can be
ranked, internally or from other systems.”203
Sylvan notes, indeed insists upon, the inescapability of systemic relativisation,
but – unlike Grey – is not made “uneasy” by it. It is, he thinks, something
we are or should be rather used to; and, more importantly, he thinks that it
tends not to inhibit semantic assessment:
“Consider, to illustrate, the evaluations of two different tribes of
mathematicians on the merit of various mathematical problems.
wrong with non-cognitivism, and what is wrong with cognitivism is what is right with
non-cognitivism; but also that what is right with non-cognitivism is what is wrong with
cognitivism, and what is wrong with non-cognitivism is what is right with cognitivism.)
202“It is hard not to feel uneasy about the instability of this position.” Grey, op. cit., p.
47.
203Sylvan, op. cit., p. 13.
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Both agree that certain problems in number theory are worth-
while, but tribe i (intuitionists) maintains that various problems
in transfinite set theory, which tribe l (of classical logicians) finds
immensely interesting, are of no real interest. From our different
relevantist framework (that of a very minor cult), we should want
to criticise both tribal frameworks, to set them both into sys-
tems involving restrictive and accordingly rejectable assumptions
(cf. Exploring Meinong’s Jungle, chapters 10-11), but on the
specific evaluations at issue we should want to side with tribe l
rather than i , arguing, from where we stand, that the transfinite
problems are of interest and important.”204
The fact is, the need for acknowledging systemic relativisation is common
and found across the board. And perhaps we should remind ourselves of
this when commenting particularly sceptically about discussions over what’s
intrinsically valuable.
“...relativisation in semantic evaluation is not peculiar to value
qualities, but rather grosser and more extensive there. But
it also applies to primary and secondary quality judgements.
Localisation and relativisation in the semantics of secondary
quality claims was forced by classical physics,205 localisation
of primary quality claims by relativity. In the assessment of
‘The box is 2 metres long’ a local frame is presupposed, and is
supplied as part of the context in semantic evaluation. In each
case primary, secondary and tertiary, there is an understood
native range (as Rolston felicitously puts it), in terms of which
semantical evaluations are made. In the tertiary case however
the cultural component of the native range bulks much larger
than with primary and secondary judgements.”206
(C) The Phenomenological Base. A few pages back, I noted Richard’s
view that emotional presentations are “emotional bases through which values
come to be known” (3). Taking this idea seriously, as he undoubtedly did
(and as I will further demonstrate), helped lead him to a view of the world
that is recognizably phenomenological in character, and therefore somewhere
between abundant and teeming (as befits one who authored a book called
204Ibid.
205I take it that the Doppler shift (of all wave phenomena) is at least one of the phenomena
being referred to here.
206Ibid., p. 15. The underlining is Richard’s.
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Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond). Take this rather remarkable
passage, for example:
“The total flow of experience (inferentially or systemically in-
fluenced or not)...that human receivers or recorders obtain is
exceedingly diverse. A forest can be experienced as dark, green-
black, oval shaped, dense, gloomy, damp, immature but millable,
ugly, ... (perhaps that is how it is). It is astonishing (especially
given the enthusiasm of empiricists for experience) that there is
an immediate, and rather automatic, reduction of this experi-
ence in mainstream scientific thought, to certain approved forms.
Experience is commonly, but quite illegitimately, cut-down to
that received through certain approved sense channels (secondary
qualities) or gathered by certain elementary verification proce-
dures (primary qualities), leaving out for instance much bodily
and psychic experience and all emotional reception. While these
sorts of distinctions between types of experience can more or less
be made out, as can other distinctions, that is no good excuse for
ditching the rest, for impoverishing the phenomenological base.
There is even less excuse for the extensive philosophical programs
committed to impoverishing the world – to deintentionalizing
it, or to removing its valuational features, to return to the main
issue.”207
Richard was insistent on the epistemic source-value, or base-value, of emo-
tional presentation.
“Much as the primary way of coming to know (experiential pri-
mary and secondary) qualities of objects is by sense perception
or presentation, through the various senses, so the primary way
of getting to know value features is by emotional presentation,
through the various modes of feeling and desire. Moreover the
‘channels’ here can be extended by equipment, devices, train-
ing, etc., as with sense presentation: this is already to some
extent evident from such things as the training of children..., the
education208 of adults...and the emergence of people of refined
207Ibid., p. 9
208Recall the Routleys’ description of the role of education in the “transformation to
environmental values” on pp. 127-8 of ‘Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics’
(1980) – quoted at the end of section VII of this paper.
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sensitivity and feeling.”209
But this – in his view – is no intuitionism, as that notion is traditionally
understood. He wishes to sharply
“...separate the emotional presentation position from intution-
ism. For it is not being claimed that there is a special moral or
value sense, which delivers reliable (or even infallible) judgements.
There is no special sense at all, but feelings which choice-making
creatures clearly have and often act upon, though in ways that
are hardly error-free. Emotional presentation affords a means,
without however offering a reduction; it enables a passage be-
tween intuitionistic objectivism and reductionistic emotivism and
subjectivism. Emotional presentation offers not the prospect of
some analysis, as on emotivism old and new, but what is very
different (though verification principles try to equate them), a
way of coming to know.”210
Meinong had argued that feeling “participates in the apprehension” of value211
(and thus is not all there is to such apprehension); and according to Sylvan
in this passage, emotional presentation offers “a way of coming to know”.
But neither is it the whole story of such acquisition. For according to Sylvan,
there is the matter of the “reliability of presentation”, and how that “is to
be ascertained, or correctness determined”. (18) He writes:
“The immediate problem is, of course, that
‘...relation-free value is not always there where it is
presented or could be presented. It is only there where,
so to speak, something which is correct is the object of
presentation. It is no easier to decide on such correct-
ness, but in general much harder, than in the analogous
case of external perception.’ (Meinong, p. 134).’”212
(D) Enter Theory. Enter theory. Much earlier (at the end of Section V),
I cited a passage from the Routleys (1980) which read:
“Evaluative features such as worth, merit, beauty are features
which...do not have a hard observational basis but are decidedly
209Sylvan, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
210Ibid., p. 18.
211In On Emotional Presentation, p. 28; and cited by R. Sylvan (1986), p. 17.
212R. Sylvan (1986), op. cit., pp. 18-19.
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theory-dependent, though the theories involved are evaluative in
character and not empirical.”213
And I concluded that
“It begins to look, then, as if any ‘good reasons’ which might be
offered for X’s being of intrinsic value will take the form of being
good reasons offered for a theory (presumably, of value), within
which X is assigned intrinsic-value status.”
Sylvan now confirms this:
“The first steps in explaining how the problem214 is resolved are
simple enough: an encompassing theory is applied to separate
out the correct from the incorrect presentations, to weed out the
wrong from the right. Thus though feelings are the source or
base, theory quickly enters, to organise and discriminate the data.
This introduction of theory, which typically enhances culture or
paradigm dependence already in the bases, enables both extension
beyond the bases to be made and a certain independence of the
bases to be achieved and also corrections of claims to be made
and correctness to be assessed.”215
The process is a familiar one, certainly in its idealized clothes.
“The structure is the same, in broad outline, in several important
cases where transition is made from a given basis in search of
correctness or rightness: not only emotional presentation and
also sense perception but as well inferential practice. Always,
for example, there is some filtration and ranking of participants
and states. For example, some perceivers are discounted because
defective or abnormal and likewise some states are excluded, e.g.
being drugged or drunk. Some states are preferred for judging,
e.g. the judge is fresh, not under stimulation or sedation, and
some judges are preferred, e.g. those especially gifted or who
have undergone appropriate training. These matters all affect
the first stage in an idealised account of the route from empirical
bases to end theory.”216
213R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 153.
214The problem of the “reliability of presentation”, and how that “is to be ascertained, or
correctness determined”. (R. Sylvan (1986), p. 18)
215Ibid., p. 19.
216Ibid.
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If there are first stages then, of course, many more, and the process is
presumably dialectical – a moving from first base emotional presentation to
initial theory construction with resultant tempering of first ‘reports from the
field’ so to speak, to better – i.e., more theoretically informed – affective
data, to more data enriched theorizing, ... etc. And, for all the good work of
theorizing, contact with the source, the base, is not to be lost. It is a “check
point”.
“The presentational basis provides us ... empirical ground and
check points in value theory. Many the theorist who neglects, or
fails to observe these empirical linkages, Quine for one:
We can judge the morality of an act only by our moral
standards themselves. Science, thanks to its links with
observation, retains some title to a correspondence
theory of truth; but a coherence theory is evidently the
lot of ethics. [There are] no empirical controls ... (p.
43); [No] empirical check points (p. 45).
Not so: these unsupported claims have to be qualified piece
by piece in the light of emotional presentation (something that
the wide appeal of emotivist theories should perhaps have sug-
gested).”217
In this section, I have sought primarily to display – as is evident from all
the citation – in some coherent order what Sylvan’s views about emotional
presentation actually were. This is because they are not widely known and,
too, because – in traditions we are most familiar with – they are rather
uncommon. They may even appear quite strange, perhaps naïve too. The
very idea that emotion might inform! Or even play some significant role
in informing. Yet, of course, we often act as if it does just that – forming
judgments, evaluative judgements (about people, about motivations, about
situations) often very quickly upon their ‘emotional presentation’ to us; and
it’s almost always later that we look to justify those evaluations if called upon
to do so by reference to facts and maybe with reference to how those facts
cohere with some decent moral or psychological theorizing as well. Sylvan
sought to call our attention to this process – certainly one which at some level
is well-recognized, but nevertheless largely ignored, or else not well-regarded
217Ibid., p. 20. The passage which Sylvan quotes from Quine is from the latter’s article,
‘On the nature of moral values’, Values and Morals (ed. A.I. Goldman and J. Kim), Reidel,
Dordrecht, 1978.
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in familiar philosophical traditions. And he sought to dignify the process
(and its source) with attention, with a description of it and its place – a
deserved place, he thought – in our coming to be acquainted with what’s
good and what’s bad.
IX. Why Intrinsic Value is not a Response-Dependent Property
We have seen218 that Richard (1994) was not friendly to the idea that
intrinsic value is best understood as a response dependent property, even
though on his analysis it does satisfy two significant conditions associated
with such properties. For, as noted, just as
“Response-dependent properties do not depend for their instanti-
ation on the existence of a single conscious entity in the whole
universe.”219
and thereby are not mere ‘subjective’ properties, neither – according to
Richard – does intrinsic value have any such dependency. And, secondly,
just as
“...analyzing [a property] in a response-dependent manner without
doubt makes [that property] existentially mind-independent, it
with equal certainty renders it conceptually mind-dependent.”220
so, too, Richard’s analysis of intrinsic value makes it conceptually mind-
dependent, for, as he and Valerie say,
“...values in a world...always depend upon a valuer existing in
some world.”221
And being “conceptually mind-dependent”, objectivism is also avoided. There
can be little doubt that these two similarities in analysis are a significant
part of what leads some commentators to suggest that, really, Richard’s
analysis is some kind of response-dependency analysis. Yet, as we have seen,
he rejects this. What reason does he have for such rejection, or what reason
might there be which would make such rejection plausible? There is one
which stands out above any other potential candidate for such, although it
presents in two modes – one logical, one epistemological.
218End of Section VI.
219R. Joyce (2009)
220Ibid.
221R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 155. Italics are the Routleys’.
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Its most immediate, unclothed, mode is this. The basic logical form which
any response-dependency analysis takes is that of an equivalence. So, for
example, Philip Pettit writing about response-dependent concepts (rather
than properties, but no matter) says they are
“...biconditionally connected, as an a priori matter, with certain
more or less primitive responses: in particular with responses of
a perceptual or affective character.”222
But there is nothing in Richard’s writing about intrinsic value that suggests
he sees any similarly-placed biconditionality. What we get from him on the
relationship between value on the one hand, and valuers and evaluation on
the other, is entirely made up of this sort of thing:
“...where a state of affairs has a value then there is a certain
valuer...who assigns that value to that state.”223
“Where object a is v then, for both values and colours, a is such
as to feel or seem v to any normal participant in given framework
s – a first-approximation connection which turns in part on the
meaning of ‘normal’.”224
“...the determination of [the] valuer [is] dependent upon the values
concerned”.225
These Sylvanesque thoughts, persistent, place sufficiency entirely with the
states of affairs having value, never on the valuer. There is no “if and only if”
here. If something is intrinsically valuable, then there is a certain valuer –
not required to be actual – who appreciates that fact. But possible evaluators
do not similarly guarantee value. It would be a “strange result”226 if
“. . . any state of affairs, however environmentally appalling, is
valuable because we can find a valuer, e.g. a spokesman for your
local development association, who would account it valuable.
222Philip Pettit, ‘Terms, Things, and Response-Dependence’, European Review of Philos-
ophy, Vol. 3 (1998), pp. 55-66; p. 55. As cited by Christopher Norris in Truth Matters:
Realism, anti-realism and response dependence, Edinburgh University Press (2002, 2005),
p. 60.
223R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 157.
224R. Sylvan (1986), op. cit., p. 15.
225R. & V. Routley (1980), op. cit., p. 157. And this time the emphasis is the Routleys’
own.
226Ibid.
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But ‘there are no values without a valuer’ properly understood
yields no such bizarre results.”227
Valuables rule, possible valuers follow. The valuables wear the pants here.
And this is one reason, I speculate, why Richard in 1994 was simply not
having it that value should be thought a response-dependent property – given
the equivalence conditions which dominate the way particular ‘response de-
pendent’ properties (or the concepts which refer to them) are analysed in the
relevant literature. With Richard, you get one-half of response dependency
analysis, but not the Full Monty. The pants remain on the valuables. His
account of value is accordingly not really an attempt at anything like a
complete analysis – certainly not a reductive one – of value at all. As he
puts the matter:
“Value is what it is, its own sort of object with its distinctive
features, and not another thing. . . .”228
The epistemological mode, or face, of this issue has, perhaps, an historical
dimension to it. I refer to the view, current hereabouts in the early 90s, that
in the case of any concept for which a response dependency analysis was
successful, it was a corollary that certain accredited ‘observers’ were immune
from error in their sincere applications of that concept. So, for example, in a
widely discussed article in Mind (1991), Philip Pettit defended the view that
“There are different conceptions of response-dependence but
under the approach adopted here response-dependent concepts
privilege certain responses on the part of subjects; they ensure
that [just] as an observer under normal conditions cannot be in
ignorance or error about the colour of something – under the
traditional view – so the responses involved in any response-
dependent area of discourse cannot lead subjects astray under
suitable conditions.”229
There is nothing I know of in Sylvan’s writings on moral or axiological
discourse that bears this kind of message. Instead, the question of ‘reliability’,
repeatedly raised by him (and Meinong too230), is – I would maintain – global
227Ibid.
228R. Sylvan (1986), op. cit., p. 3.
229Philip Pettit, ‘Realism and Response Dependence’, Mind, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 4,
Mind and Content (Oct., 1991), pp. 587-626: p. 622.
230Cf. “. . . relation-free value is not always there where it is presented or could be
presented. It is only there where, so to speak, something which is correct is the object of
presentation. It is no easier to decide on such correctness, but in general much harder,
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and unrelenting.231 Presumably, this is – at least in part – for precisely
the same reason: that, in these matters, he rejects biconditionality itself.
For, if there were cases where the valuational responses (specified non-
trivially)232 were immune from error, were infallible, then in just those cases
the valuational responses would be sufficient for the truth of the valuations.
And that is the half of the biconditional that Richard never accepted, indeed,
gave every appearance of having rejected – and sensibly so.233
than in the analogous case of external perception”. [Meinong, On Emotional Presentation,
p. 134.]
231Cf. “. . . it is not being claimed that there is a special moral or value sense, which
delivers reliable (or even infallible) judgements. There is no special sense at all, but feelings
which choice-making creatures clearly have and often act upon, though in ways that are
hardly error-free.” (R. Sylvan (1986), op. cit., p. 18)
232“. . . it is no use saying that a subject S is properly equipped to judge and that conditions
K are the right sorts of condition under which to exercise that judgement just so long as
the result of S + K is a correct. . . usage of the. . .moral-evaluative predicate in question.
Rather the specification must be one that explains just what it is about S that makes her
a competent or reliable judge in such matters, and also just what it is about the normal
set of conditions K that serves to distinguish them from other, that is, non-standard or
distorting conditions.” [Christopher Norris, Truth Matters, Edinburgh University Press,
2002, p. 60.]
233I am immensely grateful to my friend and colleague, Dominic Hyde, for being such a
willing, critical, and engaging participant in many long discussions about the Routleys’ ideas
on the matters presented above. Thanks, too, to members of the philosophy department at
the University of Queensland for bearing up so ably under the weight of two lengthy seminars;
and, earlier, to logically-minded participants at ‘Beyond the Possible – Remembering
Richard Sylvan’ (University of Melbourne – July, 2011).
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